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ABRAHAM'S LEGACY: AN EMPIRICAL
ASSESSMENT OF (NEARLY) FIRST-TIME
OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
MICHAEL EDMUND O'NEILL*
Abstract: Congress has expressly directed the United States Sentencing
Commission to ensure that the federal sentencing guidelines make
allowances for sentences other than imprisonment for certain first-time
offenders. The aim of this Article is to demystify the criminal history
categories used in that process, to create a working definition of the
"first-time federal offender," and to establish whether, as an empirical
matter, such individuals are commonly imprisoned in federal
correctional facilities. The data shows that a substantial number of
offenders who have no prior convictions are lumped together with
offenders who may be recidivists or who may have prior violent felonies.
This Article proposes modifications to the criminal history categories,
recommending the establishment of a guided downward departure for
true first-time offenders, or, in the alternative, creating a new criminal
history category for those same offenders.
INTRODUCTION
In the book of Genesis, the Lord informs the great patriarch
Abraham that He intends to destroy the cities of Sodom and Gomor-
rah because of the inhabitants' wickedness.t Abraham, however, casts
himself as the cities' apologist and seeks to defend them against God's
wrath. "Peradventure there be fifty righteous within the city:" Abra-
ham inquires of the Lord, "wilt thou also destroy and not spare the
place for the fifty righteous that are therein?" 2 Abraham bargains with
God, endeavoring to spare the cities if but a few righteous men could
*	 2001 Michael Edmund O'Neill, Assistant Professor, George Mason University
School of Law; Commissioner, United States Sentencing Commission. The views expressed
herein are my own. They neither reflect the policy nor the official positions of the United
States Sentencing Commission; thus any errors are attributable solely to me. I would like to
thank Will Consovoy and Thomas McCarthy for their helpful research assistance, as well as
Linda Maxfield, Courtney Sernisch, and Kristine Kitchens for their efforts to check the
statistical tables.
I Genesis 18:20 (King James).
2 Id, 18:24.
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be unearthed. 3 Abraham, of course, was unable to find those upright
men.
Abraham was concerned that in the punishment of the many, a
few good individuals might be unjustly treated. The desire to separate
those deserving of mercy from those meriting punishment is a human
trait, and one that is—at least in some respects—built into our crimi-
nal justice system. Human intuition, expressed in our legal norms,
tells us that first-time or otherwise low-level offenders ought to be
treated differently from those who repeatedly offend. While not yet as
precise in predicting future recidivism as might be preferred, recent
social science literature suggests that recidivists ought to be targeted
and that first-time offenders may merit punishment that is less severe
than those already hardened to the realities of the criminal justice
system.4
 Those social science findings have been echoed by political
leaders seeking to focus law enforcement efforts on the most hard-
ened and dangerous offenders.5
Popular press reports have been replete with stories suggesting
that the federal prison system is overpopulated by so-called first-time,
low-level drug offenders. 6 Indeed, stories of seemingly "innocent"
first-time offenders caught up in the "system" and relegated to spend
the next however many years of their lives locked up with more seri-
ous offenders never fail to elicit (as they should when accurately re-
ported) a sympathetic response.?
Claims of this sort (both factual and illusory) must not be dis-
missed summarily. After all, such assertions serve to mold public opin-
ion and to inform the public's understanding of the federal sentenc-
ing system. This public perception of federal sentencing's fairness is
important because it affects the system's legitimacy. In terms of its
popular legitimacy, the system's apparent fairness is in some respects
nearly as important as its actual fairness. Recognizing this fact, the
3 Id. 18:26-33.
See, e.g., 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 83-87 (Alfred Blum-
stein ed., 1983).
5 Letter from U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions to the Diana Murphy, Chair, U.S. Sentencing
Commission (July 13, 2000) (on file with author).
6 See, e.g., Ed Timms, Drug War Targets Blacks, Report Says: They're Sent to Prison on Charges
at Higher Rates than Whites, Human Rights Watch Finds, DALLAS MORNING NEws, June 8,
2000, at 6A.
7 See Nina Bernstein, Is Get-Tough Sentencing Unfair to Women?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
Aug. 25,1996, at 12A; Libby Copland, limber Smith Granted the Gift of Freedom, Clinton Com-
mutes Sentence in Publicized Drug Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 23,2000, at Cl.
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "SRA"), 8 requires the United
States Sentencing Commission (the "Sentencing Commission") to
consider public opinion in setting offense levels. 9 Whether or not
popular press stories accurately portray federal sentencing efforts,
however, they may significantly fashion the public debate. And popu-
lar perceptions inevitably filter through to elected officials, who in
turn, direct the Sentencing Commission to do "something" to combat
the crime du jour. As a consequence, despite the notorious difficulty
in capturing public opinion with respect to sentencing concerns,"
much of the Sentencing Commission's work is driven by public senti-
ment—whether directly expressed or indirectly funneled through
their duly elected representatives. To this end, it is vital for the Com-
mission to provide accurate data and information to Congress and to
the public at large to inform public debate and to shape public sen-
timent. Seldom, however, is the Sentencing Commission asked to re-
duce a penalty in response to a feeling that a crime or category of
criminal is being over-punished. Yet, this may be an important consid-
eration when considering the appropriate level of punishment for
first-time offenders.
Congress has expressly directed the Sentencing Commission to
"insure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of im-
posing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the de-
fendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of
violence or an otherwise serious offense."n The challenge is whether
this congressional directive has been effectuated. As a consequence,
the aim of this article is to demystify the criminal history categories,
which are of great significance to the federal sentencing scheme, to
create a working definition of the "first-time federal offender," and to
establish whether, as an empirical matter, such individuals are com-
monly imprisoned in federal correctional facilities.
Part I provides a background to the sentencing guidelines gener-
ally, and the criminal history categories in particular. Part II assesses
the characteristics common to Criminal History Category I offenders,
and analyzes the nature of their prior convictions—both those that
have been included for criminal history purposes and, more impor-
tantly, those that have been excluded from consideration. The data
t' Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
9 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (4)—(5) (1994).
10 See, e.g., Deirdre Golash & James P. Lynch, Should Public Opinion Guide Sentencing Pol-
icy?, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 30, 31-32 (1999).
11 28  U.S.C. § 994(j) (1994),
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exposes that a substantial number of offenders who have no prior
convictions or reported contact with the criminal justice system are
lumped together in Criminal History Category I with offenders who
may be recidivists or who may have prior violent felonies. Indeed, the
data shows that there are a number of past offenses, excluded from
the criminal history computation, that nevertheless may contain ei-
ther important indicia of violence or may demonstrate recidivist be-
havior on the part of certain offenders. The data suggests that certain
offenses ought not to be excluded from the criminal history calcula-
tion. On the other hand, there may be offenses currently scored for
criminal history purposes that are neither serious in nature, nor good
predictors of future criminal conduct.
Finally, in Part III, I suggest possible modifications to the way in
which the criminal history categories are constructed, recommending
the establishment of a guided downward departure for true first-time
offenders, or, in the alternative, creating a new criminal history cate-
gory for those same offenders. In addition, I offer the possibility of
reconfiguring the criminal history categories to reflect the nature of
the prior offense, rather than merely relying upon the previous of-
fense's sentence length as a proxy for dangerousness. Similarly, I sug-
gest that certain offenses that are presently excluded might be re-
tained if they contain certain elements of dangerousness or if they
consist of repeat offenses. To better reflect society's concern with re-
cidivism and to capture repeat offenders, current rules of exclusion
for certain prior offenses may be inadequate and thus may need to be
reconceptualized. Particularly dangerous offenses, for example, even
if they are relatively old, may nonetheless be poor candidates for ex-
clusion from criminal history. Before examining these considerations,
however, let us first turn to a few important background considera-
tions.
I. BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS
A. Why Do We Care About First-time Offenders?
In the past decade, the total local, state and federal prison popu-
lation in the United States has increased by over sixty percent and
now approaches nearly two million inmates. 12 During this same time
12 Allen J. Beck, Prison and fail Inmates at Midyear 1999, BUREAU JUST. BULL., Apr. 2000,
at 2 (U.S. Dept. of Just.).
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period, the crime rate has fallen to a twenty-six year low." Indeed, al-
though the public's fears concerning crime victimization have been
commonly exploited ht the nation's political discourse, there is some
evidence that the public's concern with personal security has abated."
As a consequence, policymakers are in a better position to reconsider
thoughtfully current sentencing policy to ensure that we are both tar-
geting the appropriate individuals and getting the most efficient pun-
ishment for our expenditure of public monies. While considerable
debate rages over whether America's stepped-up incarceration rates
have had any impact upon falling crime rates, 15 there has been in-
creased concern across the political spectrum both over the absolute
number of offenders behind bars, and whether we are imprisoning
the "right" people. What constitutes the "right" offenders, of course, is
a matter of considerable debate. Generally, it is agreed that the "right"
people to be placed behind bars tend to be violent, repeat offenders
who prey upon society.
On the other end of the criminality scale, however, there is gen-
erally an impulse to treat first-time offenders differently from those
who, although they may have committed the exact same crime, none-
theless have an extensive criminal past. The desire to give a break to
first-time offenders often springs from the same human desire to al-
low people the opportunity to be rehabilitated and the wish to have
them rejoin society. This desire to be merciful to first-time offenders
makes a certain amount of political sense as well; it is doubtless pref-
erable to reintegrate a first-time (or otherwise low-level) offender into
the community than to incarcerate that individual. Aside from the
capital costs of prison, there are important human costs; namely,
n Id.; President's Radio Address, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 112113 (Jan. 22, 2001);
Mark Arner, Clime Rate Falling in this Country and in U.S., SAN DIEGO UNION-TM., Oct. 16,
2000, at Al; Eric Lichtblau, A Narrow Win for Ashcroft Cabinet, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at
Al.
14 As of this writing, we are past the 2000 election cycle and can observe that crime
fears played virtually no part in the presidential election debates. See, e.g., Karin Scholz &
John F. Hagan, Americans Safer as Crime Decreases Again, FBI Reports, CLEF. PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 116, 2000, at 1A.
15 See Brooke A. Masters, Allen Takes Credit for Crime Dovp; Robb Disagrees, WASII. POST,
Oct. 19, 2000, at 81 (suggesting that increased imprisonment yields decreased crime). But
we Lorraine Adams & David A. Vise, Crime Rates Down for the 7th Straight Year; Experts Disagree
About Reason for Drop and the Meaning of Conflicting Trends, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1999, at A2;
Fox Butterfield, Inmates Serving More Time, Justice Department Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1999, at A10. For an analysis of this on-going debate, see William Spelman, What Recent
Studies Do (and Don't) 'fell Us About Imprisonment and Crime, 27 CRIME & JusT. 419, 420-422
(2000).
296	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 42:291
stigmatizing the offender in such a way as to impede his ability to be-
come socially productive. 16 It has yet to be demonstrated that prison
has much of a rehabilitative effect upon offenders—although selective
incapacitation surely works—and because most first-time offenders
serve less time behind bars, it may well be preferable to minimize
their prison time and maximize the time spent reintegrating them
into society.
Moreover, targeted sentencing practices ensure that prison space
is available for the most hardened, violent offenders. Such offenders
are best kept isolated from society. The availability of prison space is
ultimately limited by what the public and its elected representatives
are willing to spend to keep those convicted of crimes locked up. Al-
though there has generally been a binge of prison building over the
past twenty years (and a significant drop in crime rates), 17 and the
public has demonstrated some willingness to invest money in the
creation of additional prison space, at some point, the marginal effect
of each additional prison bed becomes increasingly negligible. That
said, however, the difficulty is in determining what constitutes a true
first-time offender, and whether such individuals are common within
the federal criminal justice system. Before delving into that question,
however, I would like to turn to a discussion of the federal sentencing
guidelines and the way in which they treat prior criminal conduct.
B. The Philosophy of Criminal History
Despite the intuition that a first-time offender ought to be
treated differently from a recidivist, should they be treated differ-
ently? After all, a case can readily be made that an individual should
pay for his present acts, not his past—particularly if he has previously
paid his debt to society. This preoccupation with a defendant's crimi-
nal past is not without considerable theoretical foundations. Indeed,
whether an offender's criminal record—or lack thereof—should be a
factor in determining an appropriate sentence for a current offense
has been a matter of significant theoretical debate—a debate which
extends back to the time of Aristotle and Plato.m Advocates for con-
Nmertheless, under a cost-benefit analysis, the net cost to society is debatable, as the
sunk costs of prison must be balanced against the savings in terms of crimes averted. See
John DiIulio & Anne Piehl, Does Prison Pay? Revisited, 13 BROOKINGS REV. 1-20 (1995); TED
R. MILLER, ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A
NEW LOOK 9-24 (1996) (estimating costs of crime).
17 See Spelnaan, supra note 15, at 419-20.
18 See generally MARY M. MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT (1981).
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sidering a defendant's criminal past° when determining the appro-
priate punishment for a crime, have justified their claims on various
grounds. Historically, retributivist and utilitarian theories of discipline
have dominated discussions of appropriate punishment levels." Dean
Roscoe Pound observed long ago that there exists a "fundamental
conflict with respect to aims and purposes" in punishment theory. 21
Each of those divergent philosophies—"those who think that punish-
ment need only be inherently just, and those who think it cannot be
justified without reference to its utility or expediency"—have
significant implications for first-time (or other low-level) offenders. 22
Traditionally, retributivists have argued for a significantly re-
duced role for criminal history in determining present levels of pun-
ishment. Proponents of so-called "just deserts" have sought to ensure
fair punishment for the present offense, not for past crimes that al-
ready may have been punished. Richard Singer, for example, has ar-
gued that criminal history is inappropriate to consider at sentencing
because the defendant has already been punished for the previous
offense." He has explained that a defendant's culpability is not in-
creased because of having committed the prior offense; nor is the
harm to the present victim any greater as a result of the prior of-
fense.24 As a consequence, it can be argued by implication that a first-
time offender should be treated no differently from a hardened re-
cidivist who has committed the same offense—each merits identical
punishment.
Others espousing this retributivist notion of punishment have
taken a slightly different approach. Andrew Von Hirsch has explained
that criminal history should impact sentencing only to the extent that
the defendant's culpability is enhanced due to his prior offenses. 25
19 The term "criminal history" is generally considered to include the defendant's prior,
adjudicated criminal behavior, and does not as a rule consider unprosecuted crimes a
defendant may have committed.
2° See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA.
L. REv. 1363, 1418 (2000) (citing Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RE-
SPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987)).
21 Roscoe Pound, Ctimina/Justire and the American. City, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVE-
LAND 576 (Roscoe Pound Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922).
22 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA. GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD: TIIE GREAT
IDEAS SYNOPTICON 489 (1992).
25 RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT
67-74 (1979).
24 See id. at 68, 70.
25 Von Hirsch is largely responsible for revival of the term "just desert." He has ex-
plained his rejection of the term "retribution" by observing that "twje do not find 'retribu-
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Von Hirsch has argued that offenders who are being sentenced for
their first offense have less culpability because they have not previ-
ously been punished. According to Von Hirsch, the first sentence
communicates that the behavior is wrong and will not be tolerated. A
sentence for a second violation can reflect the "full" weight of the law
because the offender has been alerted previously to the unacceptabil-
ity of the behavior. 26 Even so, Von Hirsch, like other retributivists, ad-
vocates only a narrow role for criminal history in determining an of-
fender's sentence for a present offense.
Utilitarians, in contrast, adhere to the notion that punishment
must be considered in the broader social context and thus have fo-
cussed more on the importance of general and specific deterrence
and the use of incapacitation (selective and otherwise) in protecting
the public and dissuading potential offenders from engaging in
criminal activity. 27
 Proponents of the utilitarian vision (to the extent a
single view can be attributed to these theorists) have thus contended
that incapacitation by the "imposition of more restrictive sentences on
those defendants who have a greater likelihood of recidivism en-
hances the protection of the public from further crimes by those de-
don' a helpful term. It has no regular use except in relation to punishment.... We prefer
the term 'desert.' Its cognate, `to deserve' is widely used.... The word 'desert' is some-
what less emotionally loaded." ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: TILE CHOICE OF PUN-
ISHMENTS 45-46 (1976). Retributive philosophies come in many guises. Professor Coning-
ham has usefully identified nine different (albeit closely related) theories that masquerade
under the term "retributivism": (1) repayment theory (the offender repays his debt to
society); (2) just desert theory (the punishment is deserved); (3) penalty theory; (4)
minimalism (conscious guilt is a minimal condition of just punishment); (5) satisfaction
theory (an offender's punishment satisfies the victims); (6) fair play theory (Kant and
Rawl's theories of justice as fairness); (7) placation theory (punishment placates the com-
munity); (8) annulment theory (Hegel's position that punishment rights the wrong) (9)
denunciation theory (punishment publicly denounces the crime). John Cottingliam, Varie-
ties of Retribution, 29 PHILA. Q. 238,238-45 (1979).
26 Von Hirsch has observed that: "The reason for treating the first offense as less seri-
ous is, we think, that repetition alters the degree of culpability that may be ascribed to the
offender. ... A repetition of the offense following that conviction may be regarded as
more culpable." VON HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 85; see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR
FUTURE CRIMES 77 (1985). Indeed, currently no guideline system completely disregards
the defendant's prior record in the determination of sentence. However, some states do
consider aspects of retributionist theory. Minnesota, for example, used this theory in a
modified format by adjusting the slope of its imprisonment/non-imprisonment line to
focus more on the current offense.
27 There are numerous forms of utilitarian-based punishments. See, e.g., THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971); H. CROSS & A. VON HIRSCH, SENTENCING
(1981).
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fendants."28 In other words, one of the few sure things that can be said
about incarceration is that it prevents an individual defendant from
offending again during the period of his incarceration—and may
serve to deter him from future criminal conduct once released from
prison. Analogously, it is hoped that stiff penalties will serve to deter
other potential criminal actors from preying upon the public. Utili-
tarians support criminal history as a tool to fashion a current sentence
that takes into account the likelihood of a defendant's propensity to
commit offenses in the future, and that assesses a defendant's culpa-
bility for having previously been placed on notice that his conduct was
wrong. In this regard, utilitarian theorists have pointed to sociological
studies seeking to establish links'between prior offenses and their abil-
ity to predict future misdeeds. From a classically utilitarian standpoint,
it makes little sense to incarcerate an individual if that person has no
prospect of engaging in further criminal conduct and if no general
deterrence objectives are attained. On the other hand, if certain of-
fenses are strongly predictive of future crimes—even if those offenses
may not be particularly serious—then the predictive power of those
crimes ought to be taken into account.
C. incapacitation and Criminal History
Emerging, in part, from each of these philosophical notions un-
derpinning sentencing policy is the theory of incapacitation. Often
referred to as "limited just deserts," this approach, which takes two
basic forms—collective and selectiye—advocates the expanded use of
imprisonment to incapacitate offenders. Both forms assume that
while offenders are in prison they will not be able to engage in
further criminal behavior. In this sense, incapacitation really mirrors
utilitarian peneological theory. Collective incapacitation seeks to
prevent crime by increasing the rate and duration of imprisonment
for a broad range of offenders, without a specific prediction of future
criminality. While doubtlessly inefficient, in that more offenders are
likely incarcerated than would re-offend, collective incapacitation
reflects the general reluctance of policymakers to engage in predic-
tions of future dangerousness, an effort that has long been viewed
28 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS (1987), reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 360 (1987).
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with suspicion by legal academics,29 but which is being re-thought in
the social science community. 30
In contrast, selective incapacitation seeks to prevent crime by us-
ing certain criteria to identify for restraint a smaller number of of-
fenders who are predicted to re-offend. Of course, selective incapaci-
tation can also serve to reduce punishment for persons who are
predicted to be less likely to commit additional crimes. While predic-
tive models have seldom been deemed reliable tools for ascertaining
present punishment levels, they have been used for determining
whether an individual should face involuntary civil commitment,m
and, with the enactment of the 1984 Bail Reform Act ("BRA"), for
assessing (in a limited way) the dangerousness of a criminal defen-
dant for purposes of setting bail. 52 More recently, claims have been
made that current predictive models represent a considerable ad-
vancement over models formerly used and are now far more reli-
able."
First-time offender status, while not necessarily explicitly ac-
knowledged as such, has long been used as something of a crude tool
to assess the likelihood of recidivism. Thus, just as judges commonly
used informal assessments of a defendant's presumed dangerousness
prior to being explicitly authorized to do so in the 1984 BRA, they
l See, e.g., Eli M. Rollman, Supreme Court Review: "Mental Illness": A Sexually Violent
Predator Is Punished Twice for One Crime, 881 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1013-14 (1998);
Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System: An
Unconstitutional Law and An Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105, 121-23
(1990); Mark David Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted? Future Dangerousness: The Testimony
of Experts in Capital Cases, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1989, at 21, 45.
3° See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Ju-
risprudence, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 5-10 (David B. Wexler & Bruce
Winick eds., 1991); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds., 1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEU-
TIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1997). For examples of
therapeutic scholarship, see Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 184, 195-97 (1997); Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the
1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. Pus. POL'Y & L. 505, 508 (1998); see
also Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health System: Expanding
the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 161, 162 (1995).
31 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353-56, 371 (1996) (upholding civil
commitment of individual).
32 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1994).
33 See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A
TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 11-35 (1999); VERNON
L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK (1998); Colleen
K. Cannon & Vernon L. Quinsey, The Likelihood of Violent Behavior: Predictions, Postdictions,
and Hindsight Bias, 27 CAN. J. BEHAV. Sct. 92, 94 (1995).
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have been using first-time offender status as a rough means of predict-
ing future dangerousness. The simple calculation is "if he's done it
before, he's likely to do it again." To a certain degree, then, selective
incapacitation has long been a factor in the criminal justice system. 54
D. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Criminal History
Although the propriety of using past criminal behavior as a factor
in determining an offender's present sentence has long been de-
bated, it is generally agreed (at least among policymakers) that crimi-
nal history has at least some role to play in sentencing. 55 The original
United States Sentencing Commission in fact determined that crimi-
nal history should be a major component in creating the sentencing
guidelines. To this end, the Commission designed Chapter Four,
Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood, as a means of capturing the
frequency, seriousness, and recency of a defendant's prior criminal
record. 56 The Commission ostensibly accepted that these past offenses
could serve as reliable predictors of future criminal conduct, and, to a
somewhat lesser degree, evidence that the offender had received no-
tice regarding his illegal conduct. As such, the Commission deter-
mined that a defendant with a record of prior criminal activity is more
culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of more serious
34 States vary in their use of selective incapacitation. For example, in the .Pennsylvania
guidelines, all prior convictions are included in the computation of the criminal history
score, although some offenses are weighed more heavily than others. Because the focus is
on the number of prior offenses, little distinction is made between types of offenders.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL § 303.4(a) (4th ed. 1994); see also John H. Kramer &
Cynthia Kempinen, History of Pennsylvania Sentencing Reform, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 152,
153 (1993); John C. Dowling, Sentencing Discretion in Pennsylvania: Has the Pendulum Re-
turned to the Thal Judge?, 26 Duq. L. Rev. 925 (1988). In contrast, Oregon uses a typography
classification of offenders that focuses not on the number of prior convictions, but, in-
stead, the type of prior offenses committed with violent offenders and repeat non-violent
felony offenders are targeted for longer sentences. Each prior conviction does not neces-
sarily contribute to the criminal history score. Consequently, in many criminal justice sys-
tems, criminal history is seen as a crucial component of the determination of an offender's
sentence because of its use as a predictor of future criminality. See U.S. SENTENCING COM-
MISSION, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1994); see also Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Mandatory Felony
Sentencing Guidelines: The Oregon Model, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 695, '705-707 (1992); Blake
Nelson, The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: The Effects of Determinate Sentencing on Disparities
in Sentencing Decisions, 10 LAW & INEQ. 217, 219 n.4 (1992).
" See 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM, SUM note 4, at 83-87.
" U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 (1998).
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punishment. 57
 Conversely, the Commission decided that offenders
who had no prior record merited less serious punishment. The
Commission sought to capture that differentiation in its construction
of the so-called criminal history categories.
1. Where Theory and Practice Meet: the United States Sentencing
Guidelines
Before turning to the empirical findings regarding Criminal His-
tory Category I, it is important to review briefly the guidelines' struc-
ture. Prior to the adoption of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
("SRA") '38
 federal sentencing was based largely on a "rehabilitative" or
"medical" model, which considered criminal history less for purposes
of punishment, and more as a means for evaluating criminality in an
effort to develop an appropriate treatment regimen." The enactment
of the federal sentencing guidelines represented a seismic shift in sen-
tencing practice and theory. 4° Elimination of disparity among defen-
dants convicted of the same offense became the guidelines' holy grail.
Sentences were no longer to be indeterminate, but rather to treat
similarly situated defendants who commit identical offenses compara-
bly.
To incorporate criminal history, the Sentencing Commission
considered various philosophical arguments regarding the appropri-
ate use of a prior record in determining a defendant's sentence. 41 The
Commission did not, however, explicitly prefer one theoretical ap-
proach over the other. Rather, the Commission expressly identified
aspects from several theoretical models in establishing so-called
37
 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-523-44, at 99 (1984) (report accompanying H.R. 6012,
one of the sentencing guideline bills considered prior to passage of the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984) (observing that "those with previous criminal histories should be pun-
ished more severely than first offenders, because the level of culpability ... is higher"); see
also MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-109 (1978).
" Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,98 Stat. 1987.
" See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 5-10
(1981) (discussing the rise and fall of the "rehabilitative" ideal); PAMALA L. GRISET, DE-
TERMINATE SENTENCING 11-12 (1991) (discussing the -rise of the rehabilitative jugger-
naut" between 1877-1970); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 305-09 (1993).
40 See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear ofJudging and the State of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louts U. L.J. 299,300-08 (2000); GRIEs-r, supra note
39,11-12,
41
 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36,ch. 4, pt. A, introductory
cmt..
20011	 Sentencing Guidelines	 303
"criminal history categories."42 These categories were designed to cap-
ture the frequency, seriousness, and recency of the defendant's prior
record. The Commission concluded that these factors were reliable
predictors of future criminal conduct. The Commission based its
creation of the various criminal history categories largely on "extant
empirical research assessing correlates of recidivism and patterns of
career criminal behavior."43 The Commission did not, however, con-
duct independent empirical assessments to determine the reliability
of the chosen factors. Rather, theSe claims of predictive power were
based on factors similar to those included in two well-known predic-
tive devices, namely the United States Parole Commission's "Salient
Factor Score" ("SFS")," and the so-called "Inslaw Scale for Selecting
Career Criminals for Special Prosecution."45 Using the SFS as its point
of departure, the original Sentencing Commission explained that:
A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more
culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater
punishment. General deterrence of criminal conduct dic-
tates that a clear message be sent to society that repeated
criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment
with each recurrence. To protect the public from further
crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidi-
vism and future criminal behavior must be considered. Re-
peated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likeli-
hood of successful rehabilitation.46
The Sentencing Commission's stated basis for the creation of the
criminal history categories demonstrates its blending of the various
theoretical approaches—not unsurprising given the fact that the
guidelines are not merely an academic's fancy, but the result of politi-
cal compromise brokered among competing interests. 47 The Commis-
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 The Parole Commission has used the SFS since 1972 to predict recidivism and guide
parole decisions. See, e.g., Peter B. Hoffman, Twenty Yeats of Operational Use of a Risk Predic-
tion Instrument: The United States Parole Commission's Salient Factor Score, 22 J. Cum. Jus•r. 477,
477-78,485-87 (1994); Peter B. Hoffman & James L. Beck, Parole Decision Making. A Salient
Factor Score, 2 J. Cuttujusr. 195-206 (1974).
45 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 361.
46 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36, ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cult.
(1998).
47 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOESTRA L. REV. 1,15-20 (1988).
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sion nevertheless planned to "review additional data insofar as they
become available in the future" to monitor the guidelines' effective-
ness." Despite that well-meant intention, the original Commission's
determination has remained largely unchanged since the guidelines'
inception.49
2. Basics of the Criminal History Category Score
Essentially, the federal sentencing guidelines utilize two numeri-
cal scores to determine a criminal offender's sentence. The first, the
offense level, represents the guidelines' determination of the offense
seriousness on a scale ranging from level one to level forty-three. The
second, the criminal history category, catalogues the prior criminal
history of the offender into one of six categories of increasing convic-
tion frequency. Criminal history is thus used as a central component
of the federal sentencing guidelines to reflect the understanding that
repeat offenders have increased culpability, are more likely to recidi-
vate, and require selective targeting as potentially dangerous offend-
ers. The six criminal history categories result from a grouping of
points assigned to each prior conviction meeting the guidelines' in-
clusion criteria. Based solely upon the prior imposed sentence's
length, included convictions are assigned one, two, or three points.
As previously observed, the federal sentencing guidelines are
unique in their approach to criminal history in that they equate the
severity of the prior offense with the length of the sentence imposed
for the previous conviction—something no other sentencing guide-
lines quite do. The guidelines allocate three points for each sentence
greater than thirteen months, assign two points for a sentence of sixty
days, and reserve one point for all other sentences." In addition, up
to three points may be assigned if the defendant was under a criminal
justice sentence at the time the current offense was committed, and
had been released from a sentence of imprisonment within two years
48 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36, ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(1998).
48 Indeed, aside from the occasional conforming amendment or technical
clarification, the only significant revision in the criminal history category was added in
1991— a sixth computation element to ensure that any violent crimes otherwise un-
counted would be included in criminal history. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 36, § 4A1.1
88 Id. § 4A1.1(a)-(c).
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of the commencement of the instant offense. 51 Counterintuitively, an
offender who has had no prior contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem is nevertheless placed in the same criminal history category as
those who have been assigned a single point, and those who, while
technically "zero-pointers," may nonetheless have uncounted criminal
pasts.
The rate of increase in severity among the criminal history cate-
gories is carefully balanced. The Sentencing Commission fashioned
the criminal history categories so that the rate at which a sentence
increases from Criminal History Category I to Category II, or from
Category II to Category III, is equivalent to a one-level increase in the
base offense level. Reflecting the greater seriousness of more substan-
tial criminal records, the Commission designated that a move from
Category III to Category IV, Category IV to Category V, or Category V
to Category VI, would represent a more Byzantine change in the of-
fense level, because these categories include much broader ranges of
criminal history points. 52
Interestingly, the Sentencing Commission designed the criminal
history categories in this fashion so that the relative increase is actu-
ally greater for less serious offenses. While this seems somewhat coun-
terintuitive—the notion being that the increase in categories actually
ought to be greater for more serious offenses—a system of this sort
51 Pursuant to § 4A1.1(d), two points are added if the defendant committed any part
of the present offense while under any criminal justice sentence. Two points are added
under § 4A1.1(e) if the defendant committed any part of the present offense fewer than
two years following release from imprisonment pursuant to a sentence counted under
§ 4A1.1(a) or (b). If two points are added under § 4A1.1(d), only one point. may be added
under § 4A1.1(e).
"While there is some variation in approach, almost every sentencing guideline system
considers a defendant's prior record in the determination of the sentence. Most states
measure both the number and seriousness of prior convictions. Sonte states weight prior
convictions depending on their severity. Other systems use prior record categories that rely
less on numerical scores or calculations and instead differentiate among types of offend-
ers, such as those with violent prior convictions, those with multiple felony convictions,
and so forth. The major advantage of differentiating by offender type is that the prior
record categories are more uniform, providing each category with more similar offenders.
Although the state systems vary by how they weigh prior record, they all assess points based
on prior offense type ranked by severity. See, e.g., Robert Batey & Stephen M. Everhart, The
Appeal Provision of Florida's Criminal Punishment Code: Unwise and Unconstitutional, 11 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (1999) (discussing Florida's "Safe Streets" Act); Kirkpatrick, supra note
34, at 705-07; Nelson, supra note 34, at 219 n.4.; Paul H. Robinson, Punishing
Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention and Criminal justice, 114 flititv. L. REV. 1429,
1435 (2001) (discussing "3-Strikes" statutes); Miriam A. Cavanaugh, Note, If You Do the
Crime, You Will Do the Time: A Look at the New Truth in Sentencing Law in Michigan, 77 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 375, 387 (2000).
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would thus more heavily penalize those at the top of the criminal his-
tory categories. The Commission, however, based its decision on so-
ciological research indicating that the crime-preventive benefits of
imprisonment decline with age. As a consequence, the Commission
reasoned that "adding any given number of years to a five-year sen-
tence, for example, is likely to be more effective in decreasing the
overall level of crime than adding the same number of years to a
twenty-year sentence."55
 In other words, the marginal benefit of add-
ing more years to lengthen sentences at the top-end of the guidelines
was thought to be small.
3. Exclusions from the Criminal History Score
As it is constructed, Criminal History Category I is an imprecise
measure of prior criminality at least in part because it encompasses
both those defendants who may have either one or no criminal his-
tory points. But is a Criminal History Category I, zero-pointer a true
first-time offender? Maybe, maybe not. Not all prior convictions are
included in the criminal history score computation. The guidelines
specifically exclude certain prior offenses. For example, the decay fac-
tor excludes from the criminal history computation those crimes oc-
curring a specified number of years prior to the instant of. 54 Similarly,
many juvenile convictions, 55 foreign convictions,56 and certain other
minor, non-felony convictions are not included in the calculation of
criminal history. 57
The most common reason that a conviction is excluded from the
computation is that it involved a minor, non-felony adjudication.58
The next three most likely reasons for exclusion involve the age of
conviction, the fact that it was a juvenile conviction, and crimes re-
lated to the present offense.59 I would like briefly to discuss the Sen-
tencing Commission's rationale for excluding these offenses.
53 &eU. S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 362.
54 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36, § 4A1,2(e).
55 Id. § 4A1.2(d).
56 Id. § 4A1.2(h).
57 Id. § 4A1.2(c).
58 Such minor convictions, which are never counted for purposes of the criminal his-
tory score, include: hitchhiking, loitering, truancy, vagrancy, minor traffic violations, etc.
U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c) (2).
" The median number of years between the instant offense sentencing date and the
convictions excluded for decay factor is sixteen.
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a. The Decay Factor
It is a general Inaxitn that "time heals all wounds." So it is with
past criminal conduct. Sentencing theorists generally assume that the
relevance of a prior offense dwindles over time. A mistake in the past,
particularly when a significant amount of time has elapsed without
any further criminal activity, is generally viewed as the best means of
determining whether an individual has been rehabilitated. In keeping
with this understanding, the Sentencing Commission opted to limit
the impact of "decayed" prior convictions by relegating them into five
different applicable time periods for the purpose of assessing criminal
history points. These time periods are dependent both upon the
length of the previously imposed sentence as well as the defendant's
age when he committed the earlier offense. 60
The Sentencing Commission's treatment of this factor differs
markedly from the Parole Commission's SFS. The SFS considers both
the defendant's "age" and "history of drug abuse" because it deemed
both of these factors to be relevant in predicting recidivism.° The
Sentencing Commission, however, chose not to rely upon a factor's
predictive power, but rather wanted to include only factors that could
be supported by both a retributivist and predictive rationale. 62 As a
result, the Sentencing Commission declined to include age and drug
abuse in the criminal history categories and instead opted to con-
struct the decay criteria that in many ways act as a proxy for the de-
fender's age at the time of conviction. 63
6° State guideline systems vary in their use of applicable time periods. States that limit
consideration of offenses generally use one applicable time period for all offenses. The
District of Columbia is the only system similar to the federal system in that it has several
different time periods. In the District's system, the applicable time period depends upon
whether the prior offense was a felony, misdemeanor, or juvenile adjudication. Some states
that do not restrict the time period in which prior offenses can be counted instead, have
"crime-free" periods from which the defendant benefits. In these states, if the defendant
remains "conviction free" for a period of time (usually 10 or 15 years not including periods
of imprisonment or release on probation or parole) prior to the instant offense, any con-
victions prior to that period are not counted. Others leave this item as a departure consid-
eration. See generally Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Apples & Oranges, 25 U.C. Davis L. REV. 679 (1992); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Reform in the
States: An Overview of the Colorado Law Review Symposium, 69 U. Cow. L. Rev. 645 (1993).
61 See Peter B. Hoffman & James L. Beck, The Origins of the Federal Criminal History Score,
9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 192, 193-94 (1997) (discussing the Sentencing Commission's
consideration of the SFS and its construction of the criminal history categories).
62 See id. at 193.
e See id.
308	 Boston College Law Review 	 (Vol. 42:291
b. Juvenile Convictions
Similar to an offense's "staleness," most people are particularly
forgiving when it comes to juvenile offenses, so-called youthful indis-
cretions.64 The guidelines currently do consider offenses that oc-
curred before the defendant's eighteenth birthday, except under cer-
tain narrow circumstances. Such juvenile offenses, however, cannot
receive more than two points unless the defendant was convicted as
an adult. 65
Using juvenile offenses to inform criminal history computations
has been controversial. Some argue that juvenile•adjudications should
not contribute to the criminal history score because juvenile courts
typically focus on the juvenile's welfare and treatment, and generally
have a more informal process. For example, juvenile courts' standard
of proof may be somewhat lower than adult courts, counsel may not
always be afforded, and the proceedings may not include all federally
guaranteed procedural protections.
More importantly, juvenile records are less reliable than adult
records because of different jurisdictional policies on recording and
disclosing juvenile offenses. As a practical matter, then, while juvenile
records may be available for a defendant in one state, they may not be
available for an otherwise similarly situated defendant who had the
fortune to be convicted in a state that shields juvenile convictions.
This inconsistency can result in substantial disparity in the criminal
history score computation.66 Some juveniles are penalized because the
" This has been changing as pressure has mounted to treat juvenile offenders who
commit serious offenses similarly to their adult counterparts. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop,
Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81, 83-84 (2000);
Cynthia Conward, The Juvenile Justice System: Not Necessarily in the Best Interests of Children, 33
New ENG. L. Rev. 39, 47-51 (1998); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Impos-
ing Life without Parole in Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 681-84 (1998).
65 Two points can be assessed if the period of incarceration extended into the five-year
period prior to the commencement of the instant offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 36, § 4A1.2(d) (2) (A). One point can be assessed if sentence was Un-
posed within the five-year period prior to the commencement of the instant offense. Id.
66 Nonetheless, most states include juvenile adjudications in the computation of
criminal history score because many argue that a juvenile record, in particular violent
behavior, is a strong predictor of future criminal conduct. See David Dormont, Note, For the
Good of the Adult: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to
Enhance Adult Sentences, 75 1v11NN. L. REv. 1769 (1991). In fact, some restrict the use of ju-
venile offenses to include only convictions for violent offenses. Others restrict the use of
juvenile offenses if the defendant is au older offender. For example, in Maryland, juvenile
convictions are not included in the sentence determination if the defendant is twenty-six
years of age or older at the time of commission of the instant offense. The argument is
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state may make their criminal records available to federal probation
officers, while other juveniles may receive an unexpected benefit in
that their juvenile offenses may be sealed and are thus unavailable. As
a result, a supposedly first-time federal offender may be anything but,
and in fact may have a substantial juvenile record that may not be
counted (or even available).
c. Crimes Related to the Present Offense
Acknowledging that ancillary crimes related to the offense of
sentencing do not necessarily have predictive power, the Sentencing
Commission chose not to include such offenses for criminal history
purposes. What constitutes a "related offense" for purposes of the
criminal history computation is fairly complicated. Basically, the
guidelines consider prior sentences as related if they "(A) occurred
on the same occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or
plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing." 67 That is not
quite the end of the story, however. If the previous offenses were sepa-
rated by intervening arrests, the guidelines do not consider them re-
lated, and they therefore become fair game for inclusion in the
criminal history score, 68
One result of this rule is that related cases receive only a single
set of criminal history points regardless of the number of offenses for
which sentence was imposed. Nevertheless, there is an important ex-
ception where one (or more) of the related cases is a crime of vio-
lence. Sentencing Guideline section 4A1 .1 (f) permits a one point in-
crease (up to a total of three points) for each prior crime of violence
that did not receive any points because it was considered related to
another sentence for a crime of violence. Although this rule is likely
one of the most confusing in Chapter Four, as a practical matter, in
most cases, only the most serious of the offenses is used to determine
the criminal history score. Few, if any, of these defendants will end up
in Category I.
that as the offender gets older, the use of a juvenile record as predictor of criminality di-
minishes.
67 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Supra note 36, § 4A1.2, elm. n.l.
68 See id.
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IL ASSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
CATEGORY I OFFENDERS & OFFENSES
A. Case Studies
One difficulty with the current design of criminal history catego-
ries is their precision in measuring future recidivism and their ability
to measure the offender's increased culpability as a result of his pre-
vious contact with the criminal justice system. As a simple matter of
equity, consider the following actual defendants culled from Sentenc-
ing Commission data: each of the four defendants is a male between
twenty and thirty years old and was convicted of trafficking in 5000
kilograms of cocaine. 69 None of the defendants received an en-
hancement for carrying a weapon, but neither did any of the defen-
dants receive any sort of departure—upward or downward. The only
discernable difference among these defendants, all of whom fall
within Criminal History Category I and have zero criminal history
points, is in their actual criminal records. Defendant A has no prior
criminal convictions of any sort, counted under criminal history or
not, nor has he had any prior contact with the criminal justice system.
He is, in fact, a true first-time offender. Defendant B has a prior, non-
violent minor criminal conviction, but otherwise his record is clean.
Defendant C, on the other hand, has a prior violent offense, a previ-
ous minor offense, and two juvenile offenses, but none of those of-
fenses is scored for criminal history purposes because each of his
prior convictions is either too old, too insignificant, or otherwise fits
within the purview of excludable prior offenses. Finally, Defendant D
has a single prior drug trafficking conviction—similar to the present
offense of conviction—but that offense's age excludes it from consid-
eration.
The issue is, all other things being equal, whether these offenders
ought to be treated similarly, whether the existence—or lack—of
prior convictions warrants special consideration, or even whether the
nature of the prior offenses merits differentiation in terms of pun-
ishment. After all, in other circumstances, the criminal history catego-
ries distinguish among offenses. Keeping these considerations in
mind, however, I would first like to turn to developing a working
definition of first-time and low-level offenders.
69 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STA-
TISTICS (2000).
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B. Devilish Definitions
As that venerable saying goes, the devil is in the details. Arriving
at an appropriate definition for a low-level, first-time offender" is
fraught with difficulty. To a casual observer, a true first-time offender
might be someone who had never previously been convicted of a
crime. I think that would likely be the definition the standard person-
on-the-street might provide. To the extent such a definition is applied,
it is likely that many otherwise seemingly law abiding folks might drop
out of the definition. The original Sentencing Commission, in estab-
lishing criteria for the criminal history categories, instead adopted a
series of compromises for incorporating criminal history into the
guidelines. While it might be easy to define a first-time offender solely
in the context of being in Criminal History Category I, such a meas-
ure is not terribly reliable. As this article will show, the term "first-
time" offender may mean several things: First, a non-citizen may have
no prior criminal record in the United States, but that does not mean
that she is a true first-time offender. A non-citizen may have prior for-
eign convictions, which are not counted for criminal history pur-
poses." Good reasons—both practical and theoretical—doubtless ex-
ist for excluding foreign-based convictions, but it is incongruous to
suggest that an offender who has a previous serious offense is a true
first-time offender.
Second, certain juvenile offenses may not be available, in no
small part due to the inadequacy of juvenile justice system record
keeping, or may have been statutorily expunged. American criminal
justice systems have long treated juvenile offenders differently from
adult offenders, but the existence of juvenile offenses (provided they
are sufficiently serious) would remove an individual from first-time
offender status. Finally, the sentencing guidelines themselves exclude
a "sentence imposed more than fifteen years prior to the defendant's
commencement of the instant offense." 71 Under such circumstances,
the offender is granted an indulgence for an old offense. Often, these
offenses wind up being juvenile infractions. Regardless, the mere fact
that such an offense exists ought to remove the offender from the
category of true first-time offenders.
70 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Supra note 36, § 4A1.2(h). Foreign sen-
tences, however, may be taken into account under § 4A1.3, Adequacy of Criminal History
Category.
71 Id. § 4A1.1, cmt. n.l.
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For the purposes of this article, "first-time" offenders will be lim-
ited to those who have no prior criminal offenses (at least, no prior
recorded criminal offenses). Distinctions will be drawn between those
who have no prior recorded offenses and those who have no assign-
able criminal history category points. A first-time offender should
have no prior criminal convictions—whether excluded or not. Low-
level offenders will simply denote those non first-time offenders who
nevertheless fall within Criminal History Category 1. 72
No doubt, critics will note that few differences exist between
"true" first-time offenders, and those who may have but a single con-
viction or even several minor convictions. It may be argued that a sin-
gle prior conviction (or even a string of minor violations) has neither
predictive power nor does it demonstrate that the offender has any
greater culpability. While this complaint has merit, it must be noted
that as Rome was not built in a day, neither can reform for first-time
offenders, however defined, take place over night. Morally, legally,
and politically there is a difference (however small) between a true
first-time offender and one who has a prior record. What is ultimately
important—or at least what Congress appeared to think was impor-
tant—is whether the prior offenses either demonstrate the likelihood
of recidivism, illustrate the defendant's dangerousness to the com-
munity, or suggest a greater degree of culpability.
That just results cannot be reached for a majority of offenders,
however, does not imply that something should not be done for those
offenders who may have a certain degree of political popularity as
well. A second—more serious, in my view—criticism may be leveled at
this definition: non-citizen offenders may have foreign convictions
that remain untallied and certain juvenile offenses may not be discov-
erable. The answer to this argument must lie in practicality. While it is
true that certain offenders who appear to have entirely clean records
may in fact have prior convictions, those individuals should not be
permitted to drive the system. Moreover, the practicality of uncover-
ing foreign convictions (and some juvenile convictions, to a lesser de-
gree) will always plague the system in some respect. Once again, how-
72
 The Department °Oust ice, in its 1994 report An Analysis of Non-Violent Drug Offenders
with Minimal Criminal Histories (Feb. 4, 1994), used two different sets of criteria for defining
low-level drug offenders. The Department created two classes of offenders, those who had
no current or prior violence in their records, no involvement in sophisticated criminal
activity, and no prior commitment." Id. at 2. The second offender class was restricted to
"those offenders with zero criminal history category points? Id. For purposes of this arti-
cle, 1 have chosen to use a slight variation on these criteria.
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ever, this practical reality ought not outweigh the possibility of com-
porting the congressional directive to treat first-time offenders (how-
ever defined) differently from other offenders.
I therefore think it safe to include within any reasonable
definition of "first-time offender" those who fall within Criminal His-
tory Category I and have zero criminal history points, and no other
known convictions. As a reference of comparison, given the fairly mi-
nor offenses that can add a single point to an offender's score, the
ensuing discussion will keep track of those individuals within Criminal
History Category I who have but a single point as well.
C. The Characteristics of Criminal History Category I Offenders
in the Federal System
1. Description of the Research Methodology
In order to prepare this analysis, data was used from the Sentenc-
ing Commission's Intensive Study Sample ("ISS") as well as the 1999
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics." The ISS data comprises a five
percent random sample of all fiscal year 1995 federal convictions in
which the United States Sentencing Guidelines were applicable. 74 The
sample resulted in the intensive study of 1918 individual federal cases.
For these 1918 sampled cases, standard data files collected by the
Commission were supplemented by coding additional detailed infor-
mation on prior criminal convictions, offender personal characteris-
tics, elements of the offense conduct, and aspects of drug involvement
as indicated in the individual defendant's presentence reports. Proba-
tion officers create presentence reports for use at the sentencing
hearing; these reports represent the most comprehensive, and (pre-
sumably) accurate, information about defendants prior criminal be-
havior that is currently available to researchers. 75
• 73 This includes the latest sentencing data available to researchers. See U.S. SENTENc-
ING COMMISSION, supra note 69.
74 For a discusSion of trends in federal criminal history data that illustrate the similar-
ity in criminal history data since the ISS data were collected in fiscal year 1995, see Linda
Drazga Maxfield, Trends in the Prior Conviction Confinement Lengths for Offenders Sen-
tenced Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Man 2000) (Office of Policy Analysis
Research Working Paper, U.S. Sentencing Commission) (on file with author).
75 The information recorded for each offender's criminal history included for each
prior conviction; the date and location of any prior conviction (s); the type of offense; the
presence of threatened (or actual) violence; the presence and extent of victim injury; the
presence, type and use of any weapon; the imposed sentence length; and all points as-
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As with any study of this sort, inescapable caveats are important
to keep in mind. Among the important methodological limitations
that must be noted, for example, the methodology used herein pools
all prior convictions receiving criminal history points across the of-
fenders included in the ISS. As a consequence, the set of prior convic-
tions studied are not a true random sample of all prior convictions of
federal offenders. It is not unlikely that correlations exist between of-
fense characteristics of one offender's multiple same-offense convic-
tions or that propensities for dangerousness are person-based rather
than offense-based. Absent the tracking and cross-correlation of
specific offenders and offenses, it is difficult to separate out such bias.
Despite the fact, however, that the statistics recounted here may be
biased in an unknown direction and to an unknown degree, given the
sample's randomness, it will be assumed for purposes of this article
that any potential bias is negligible.
A second limitation with the data must similarly•be noted, and
cannot be sufficiently emphasized. In 1995, roughly 24.8% of offend-
ers falling within Criminal History Category I were non-citizens; simi-
larly, in 1999, 24.8% were non-citizens. 76
 As a result, it is difficult—if
not impossible in some cases—to assess with precision their prior
criminal behavior. Thus, even many of those who receive no more
than a single criminal history point, may in fact have a significant
criminal past. The difficulty of obtaining criminal records from for-
eign governments, places certain limitations on conclusions that can
be drawn from the sample. Moreover, it is not altogether unlikely that
the identities of illegal aliens who commit repeat offenses (to the ex-
tent any fall into that category) may change from one offense to an-
other and thus will prove difficult to track. That having been said, it is
still possible to get some sort of an idea of the characteristics of first-
time offenders in the federal system.
signed in the Chapter Four criminal history computation. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.1; FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32 (b).
76
 In 1995, 15,475 offenders had zero criminal history points; of those individuals, 73%
were citizens, and 27% were non-citizens. There were 3310 offenders who had one crimi-
nal history point; 85% were citizens and 15% were non-citizens. As an important point of
comparison, in 1999, 20,707 offenders had no criminal history points. Roughly 64% were
citizens, and 36% were non-citizens. There were 4429 offenders who had one criminal
history point; 80% were citizens and 20% were non-citizens. The overall proportion of
non-citizen offenders increased from about 25% in 1995 to about 33% in 1999, reflecting,
among other things, possible increases in illegal immigration, prosecutorial decisions and
law enforcement efforts. Data on file with the United States Sentencing Commission.
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2. Summary of the Age, Race and Gender of Category 1 Offenders
As might be expected, Criminal History Category I is dominated
by young males.77 Fully 43.6% of all 1999 Category I offenders are
thirty years old or younger, and 78.3% are male. Hispanics, followed
by whites, are most frequently represented in Criminal History Cate-
gory I. The following table illustrates the age, race, and gender of of-
fenders who fall within that category.
Table 1
Age, Race, and Gender of Offenders in Criminal History Category 1 78
All Criminal History
Category I
0 Criminal History
Points 1 Criminal History Point
TOTAL" 27,026 100.0 20,689 76.6 6,337 23.4
Age 26,787 100.0 20,463 100.0 6,324 100.0
Under 21 1,793 6.7 1,396 6.8 397 6.3
21 to 25 4,995 18.7 3,675 18.0 1,320 20.9
26 to 30 4,866 18.2 3,564 17.4 1,302 20.6
31 to 35 3,998 14.9 3,006 14.7 992 15.6
36 to 40 3,441 12.8 2,606 12.7 835 13.2
41 to 50 4,721 17.6 3,731 18.2 990 15.7
Over 50 2,973 11.1 2,485 12.2 488 7.7
Race 26,932 100.0 20,610 100.0 6,322 100.0
White 9,430 35.0 7,211 35.0 2,219 35.1
Black 5,597 20.8 3,755 18.2 1,842 29.2
Hispanic88 10,492 39.0 8,505 41.3 1,987 31.4
Other 1,413 5.2 1,139 5.5 274 4.3
Gender 27,025 100.0 20,688 100.0 6,337 100.0
Male 21,151 78.3 15,876 76.7 5,275 83.2
Female 5,874 21.7 4,812 23.3 1,062 16.8
77 Of the 27,026 cases in Criminal History Category 1, 325 cases were excluded from
the separate analyses due to missing values on one or more of the included variables: miss-
ing age (239), missing gender (1), or missing race (94). Descriptions of variables used in
this table are provided in U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1999 DATAFILE, Appendix A.,
USSCFY99 (on tile with author) (hereinafter 1999 DATAFILE).
"Fiscal Year 1999. SOURCE: 1999 DATAFILE, supra note 77..
79 Or the 27,026 cases in Criminal History Category I, 325 cases were excluded from
the separate analyses due to missing values on one or more of the included variables: miss-
ing age (239), missing gender (1), or missing race (94). Descriptions of variables used in
this table are provided in Appendix A.
8° For the purposes of this analysis, defendants whose ethnic background is designated
as Hispanic are represented as Hispanic regardless of racial background.
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3. The Characteristics of Category I Offenders
Employing the working definitions of first-time and low-level of-
fenders," we can focus solely on those offenders who fall within
Criminal History Category I. In fiscal year 1999, the latest year for
which data is available,82
 25,346 offenders fell within that criminal his-
tory category." That number represents some 52.7% of all federal
offenders sentenced under the guidelines.84 In other words, slightly
over half of all federal offenders fall within Criminal History Category
I and thereby have garnered no more than a single criminal history
point. That is not an insignificant number, and obviously represents a
substantial commitment of federal resources to prosecuting a particu-
lar type of criminal defendant, namely those who may have no sub-
stantial (reported) criminal past. Any refinement of Criminal History
Category I alone could thus affect over half of all federal offenders.
Lest we become too detached by referring to mere numbers, however,
let us recall that this represents 25,346 men and women (a number
equivalent to a good-sized state university) who are serving time in
federal prison. They are not leading otherwise productive lives and
have previously been convicted of no more than a single (that is, re-
cordable and not ignored for other reasons) criminal offense. 85
4. The Characteristics of Present Convictions
If a principal feature of criminal history is to determine who is
most deserving of increased punishment either (I) because they
"know" about the system and thus were in some way forewarned and
more culpable, or (2) present a danger because of their prior crimi-
nal record, then the relative "dangerousness" of their previous offense
or offenses ought to be taken into account, as well as whether they
have repeated particular types of offenses.
81 See discussion supra Part IB.
62 This is the latest available data at this writing. See U.S. SENTENCING Commtssiorq, su-
pra note 69.
83 Id. at 46.
" A group of 55,557 individuals. Id. This total includes only those defendants con-
victed in federal court who are subject to the sentencing guidelines, which necessarily ex-
cludes, for example, military offenders.
88
 The only good rationale for grouping one-pointers with those who have no prior
convictions is if the prior offenses have either no predictive power or do not tend to in-
crease acknowledged criminal culpability.
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With this in mind, the following table identifies the offense
types86 for those cases in 1999 where the offender was in Criminal His-
tory Category I:
Table 2
Offense Type for Those Cases in FV99 Where the Offender Was in Criminal History
Category I.
Offense Type FrequencyTM 7 Percent Frequency Percent
Murder 57	 . 0.2 57 0.2
Manslaughter 89 0.1 96 0.3
Kidnapping 39 0.1 135 0.5
Sex Abuse 158 0.5 293 1.0
Assault 199 0.7 492 1.7
Robbery 539 1.9 1031 3.6
Arson 41 0.1 1072 3.7
Drug Trafficking 12309 42.7 13381 46.4
Drug Comm Fac 196 0.7 13577 47.0
Drug Simp Poss 349 1.2 13926 48.3
Firearms 657 2.3 14583 50.5
Burglary/B/E 24 0.1 14607 50.6
Auto Theft 80 0.3 14687 50.9
Larceny 1407 4.9 16094 55.8
Fraud 4261 14.8 20355 70.5
Embezzlement 873 3.0 21228 73.6
Forg/Counterf 630 2.2 21858 75.7
Bribery 173 0.6 22031 76.3
Tax Offenses 640 2.2 22671 78.6
Launder 782 2.7 23453 81.3
Extorts/Racket 509 1.8 23962 83.0
(Iamb/Lonely 105 0.4 24067 83.4
Civil Rights 63 0.2 24130 83.6
Immigration 2760 9.6 26890 93.2
Porn/Prost 337 1.2 27227 94.3
Prison Offenses 28 0.1 27255 94.4
Admin Justice 555 1.9 27810 96.4
Env/Fish & Wild 157 '0.5 27967 96.9
National defense 17 0.1 27984 97.0
Antitrust 42 0.1 28026 97.1
Food & Drug 59 0.2 28085 97.3
Other 773 2.7 28858 100.0
As the table recounts, by far the most common offense of convic-
tion for Category I offenders is drug trafficking (42.7%). Contrary
perhaps to popularly held belief, simple drug possession represents
only 1.2% of all the Criminal History Category I convictions. The sec-
ond most common offense type represented in Criminal History
86 For the purposes of this table, "offense type" is classified by the statute of conviction
that had the highest statutory maximum prison sentence.
87 Frequency Missing = 47.
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Category I is fraud (14.8%), followed by immigration offenses
(broadly defined) (9.6%).
	 •
Curiously, the number of violent crimes represented in Criminal
History Category I include: 57 murders, 539 robberies, 199 assaults,
and 158 sexual abuse cases. The following table reports the length of
imprisonment for Criminal History Category I offenders:
Table 3
Length of hnprisonment88 for Criminal History Category I Offenders
Sentenced in FV99
All CHC Offenders CHC I with Zero
Points
CHC I with One
Point
Offense Type of
Instant Offense
n
Median Mean
months months n
Median	 Mean
months months n
Median
months
Mean
months
Murder 6e+89 114.0 136.4 5e+87 114.0 142.4 9e+65 114.0 102.4
Manslaughter 16.0 21.1 16.0 23.5 13.0 11.3
Kidnapping 68.0 112.1 61.5 110.7 118.0 119.0
Sex Abuse 34.5 62.4 36.0 65.9 24.0 48.7
Assault 23.5 30.8 23.0 32.0 24.0 26.8
Robbery 51.0 79.2 51.0 76.8 57.0 85.5
Arson 60.0 58.3 54.0 50.1 60.0 77.8
Drug Trafficking 37.0 53.1 36.0 50.5 46.0 64.2
Drug Comm Facility 46.0 43.3 46.0 43.2 47.0 43.7
Drug Simple Possession 6.0 12.3 6.0 8.3 6.0 24.9
Firearms 19.5 35.0 18.0 36.9 21.5 30.6
Burglary/B/E 15.0 14.7 15.0 16.4 14.0 12.1
Auto Theft 12.0 41.6 12.0 48.6 5.0 6.7
Larceny 10.0 13.7 11.0 14.1 10.0 11.6
Fraud 12.0 15.9 12.0 16.4 10.0 13.0
Embezzlement 4.0 8.7 4.0 8.7 4,0 8.8
Forgery/Counterfeiting 11.0 10.9 12.0 i 1.2 9.0 10.0
Bribery 12.0 16.2 12.0 16.9 6.0 10.3
Tax Offenses 12.0 17.2 12.0 15.3 11.0 33.2
Money Laundering 30.0 37.8 30.0 37.8 31.0 37.6
Extortion/Racket 46.0 72.5 46.0 73.4 41.5 68.0
Gambling/Lottery 6.0 9.5 6.0 8.9 12.0 12.0
Civil Rights 27.0 44.0 25.5 48.4 27.0 26.4
Itmidgration 7.0 11.1 7.0 10.9 6.5 12.4
Porn/Prostitution 27.0 42.4 27.0 41.6 30.0 46.8
Prison Offenses 9.0 15.8 6.0 16.2 12.0 12.0
Aduain Justice 12.0 21.1 12.0 21.0 12.0 22.1
Emiron./Fish/Wildlife 6.0 10.9 7.0 11.7 4.5 7.7
" Sentence length statistics include time sentenced to prison. Cases with zero months
in prison ordered are excluded. The information presented in this table does not include
any time of confinement as defined in the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 36, § 5C1.1. This table excludes cases where offender data are missing for any or all of
the following variables: instant offense type, criminal history category, the sum of all
criminal history points received by the offender, or sentence length. 1999 DATAFILE, supra
note 77.
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Table 3
Length of Imprisonment" for Criminal History Category I Offenders
Sentenced in FV.,)9
National Defense 27.0 78.6 30.0 84.5 5,0 5.0
Antitrust 3.5 8.4 3.5 8.4
Food and Drug 4.0 7.6 4.0 7.8 8.0 6,7
Other 11.5 20.6 12.0 21.1 6.0 18.2
Of course, the present offense of conviction has no bearing upon the
criminal history category. As a result, we shall turn to the characteris-
tics of the prior offenses which in fact determine the criminal history
categories.
5. Characteristics of Prior Offenses
The following section will examine the nature of offenses both
included and, more importantly, excluded from the criminal history
computation.
a. Offenses Included in the Criminal History Computation
For all federal offenders, 1995 ISS data indicate that only an es-
timated 47.6% of prior convictions find their way into the criminal
history computation. For federal offenders who have previous convic-
tions, on average between thirty to forty percent of those prior convic-
tions are excluded from the criminal history computation because
they fail one of the criteria for inclusion. As a consequence, an of-
fender with four convictions included in his criminal history score will
have on average 3.1 of those earlier convictions excluded from the
criminal history computation. Of importance for this article, even for
an offender with no included prior convictions of record, that offender
nevertheless on average had 2.3 actual convictions that were excluded
from the criminal history category score. Thus, even the average "zero
pointer" in Criminal History Category I had roughly two prior convic-
tions not counted for criminal history purposes. As previously ex-
plained, this demonstrates the fallacy of defining offenders with zero
criminal history points as true "first-time offenders." In fact, these of-
fenders may have prior convictions, but those convictions are ex-
cluded pursuant to the criminal history scoring rules. 89
89 It is important to note that the majority of prior excluded offenses, regardless of
their offense category, received sentences of less than 60 days. This, of course, suggests
that most of these offenses are fairly minor.
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Table 4
Average Number of Prior Convictions Excluded from Criminal History Computation 9°
# of Convictions Included in Computation
	 Average # of Convictions Excluded
0	 2.3
1.1
2	 1.8
3	 2.1
4	 3.1
5	 3.3
6	 4
7	 3.8
8	 3.2
9	 4.8
10 or more	 5.5
More importantly, however, of those offenders within Category I,
some 20,929 persons, or 43.7% of all federal offenders, have no as-
signable criminal history points. 91 And roughly 4,450 offenders, or
9.3% of the total number of offenders, have only one criminal history
point.92
To further refine this analysis, among offenders with no reportable
criminal history points, we find that (according to ISS data) 71%
(taken from a random sampling of 726 zero criminal history point
cases) have no recorded prior offenses at all. In other words, these
individuals do not have any convictions of record on file in any crimi-
nal justice system (state or federal) that are publicly reported (and/or
available). That does not mean, as has been emphasized elsewhere,
that their records are entirely "clean." These defendants may have
juvenile offenses, foreign convictions, or other expunged priors. What
it does mean, however, is that insofar as it is ascertainable, these de-
fendants have no convictions of record that are known to federal ju-
dicial officials.
90
 For offenders with prior convictions, on average 30% to 40% of the convictions do
not meet conditions for inclusion in the criminal history computation. Note that the chart
includes all offenders with any prior convictions. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIVE PER-
CENT INTENSIVE STUDY SAMPLE OF OFFENDER DATAFILE OPAF195 (on file with author)
(hereinafter FIVE PERCENT SAMPLE).
91 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 45. Among these offenders, 64%
were U.S. citizens, and approximately 36% were aliens.
92
 By comparison, in 1995, the year for which the ISS was done, there were 50,754
cases for which the Sentencing Commission was able to compile sentencing data. Of those,
roughly 57% comprised Category I offenders. Roughly 80% of these offenders were U.S.
citizens, and 20% were non-citizens.
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Table 5
Reasons for Exclusion of Prior Convictions in Zero Criminal History Point Cases
Fiscal Year 1995"
Reason
Convictions w/o Counsel/Waiver 0.2
Overturned Conviction 0.4
Diversionary Sentence 1.3
Foreign Offense 3.2
juvenile/Status Conviction 9.5
Expunged 0.4
Military Offense 0.2
Minor Offense 43.3
Part of Instant Offense 1.7
Related Case 2.3
Tribal Offense 3.8
Conviction Too Old 29.4
Other 4.2
The remaining 29% of defendants with recorded offenses, how-
ever, have convictions that were statutorily excluded from the criminal
history computation and thus were not assigned a criminal history
point. These are "zero pointers" who nevertheless have a prior convic-
tion of record. In concert with the guidelines' understanding of the
purposes for considering past offenses in sentencing a defendant for a
present offense, it is important to understand the nature of those
prior offenses. As the table shows, the most commonly excluded of-
fense was vehicular (although not one involving drunken driving).
Indeed, slightly over a quarter (25.3%) of these excluded prior con-
victions involved a vehicular offense of some type. Other minor of-
fenses comprised the second-most significant category (17.7%),
closely followed by theft (16.7%). Among the more serious offenses
identified as being excluded, drug trafficking accounted for 3.2% of
excluded prior convictions; burglary 2J %; and, murder 0.6% of ex-
cluded convictions.
Table 6
Types of Excluded Prior Convictions in Zero Criminal History Point Cases
Fiscal Year 1995"
Offense Type
Burglary 2.1
Weapons 3.0
White Collar 5.1
93 Representing 474 Offenses in 210 Cases (29.0% of 726 Zero Criminal History Point
Cases). FIVE PERCENT SAMPLE, supra note 90.
94 Id.
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Table 6
Types of Excluded Prior Convictions in Zero Criminal History Point Cases
Fiscal Year 1995"
Immigration 1.3
Drug Possession 4.6
DUI/DWI 6.8
Vehicular 25.3
Disorderly Conduct 4.0
Murder 0.6
Assault 5.3
Robbery 2.1
Drug Trafficking 3.2
Theft 16.7
Other Minor Offense 17.7
Other Serious Offense 2.3
A similar story is told by the data collected for offenders with a
single criminal history point. Approximately 44.5% of the 247 sam-
pled one criminal history point cases had one or more excluded prior
offenses.
Table 7
Reasons for Exclusion of Prior Convictions in One Criminal History Point Cases"
Fiscal Year 1995
Reason
Diversionary Sentence 0.4
Foreign Offense 0.8
Juvenile/Status Conviction 4.9
Military Offense 2.0
Minor Offense 54.2
Part of Instant Offense 3.7
Related Case 4.5
Conviction too Old 24.6
Overturned Conviction 0.4
Convictions w/o Counsel/Waiver 0.4
Other 4.1
Non-alcohol related vehicular offenses are the most commonly
excluded prior offenses for those registering one criminal history
point, followed by the "other minor offense" category (20.1%) and
theft (10.2%). With regard to the more serious excluded offenses,
burglary accounted for 1.2% of those convictions; drug trafficking
4.1% of offenses; other serious offenses 2.5%; and, murder 0.8%.
" 244 Offenses in 110 Cases (44.5% of 247 One Criminal History Point Cases). FIVE
PERCENT SAMPLE, supra note 90.
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Table 8
Types of Excluded Prior Convictions in One Criminal History Point Cases Fiscal Year
199596
Offense Type
White Collar 2.9
immigration 0.8
Drug Possession 4.5
DUI/DWI 0.7
Vehicular 29.9
Disorderly Conduct 7.0
Murder 0.8
Sexual Assault 0.4
Assault 5.3
Robbery 1.2
Drug Trafficking 4.1
Theft 10.2
Burglary 1.2
Weapons 3.3
Other Serious Offense 2.5
Other Minor Offense 20.1
It is not surprising that vehicular offenses or other non-felony
minor offenses would be excluded; what is more troubling perhaps is
that nearly ten percent of these excluded offenses are fairly serious in
nature.
b. The Nature of the Prior Convictions
If one accepts the original Sentencing Commission's reasoning
for using certain prior convictions to fashion a sentence for a present
offense, then one must look to whether those prior convictions tend
to predict a defendant's dangerousness, likelihood of recidivism, or
whether—on account of prior contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem—the defendant is somehow more "culpable." 97 Thus, a ready
means of assessing these prior convictions is to determine their rela-
tive "dangerousness" or to determine whether they are able to predict
recidivist conduct.
90 FIVE PERCENT SAMPLE, SUpra note 90.
in See discussion supra Part IB.
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i. Differentiating Dangerousness on the Nature of the Offense
(a) Sentencing Length as a Proxy for Dangerousness
As previously explained, the original Sentencing Commission
elected to adopt its current criminal history methodology after bal-
ancing a variety of considerations. Assessing the relative seriousness of
a prior offense proved to be a challenge. The Commission rejected
the idea of using an offense-based system (employed in many states)
for assessing a prior record on the grounds that it might incorporate
the inevitable prosecutorial disparity that results from varying charg-
ing and plea practices. 98 Instead, the Commission found that basing
the criminal history score on the prior sentence length reflects a judi-
cial assessment of the seriousness of the underlying criminal con-
duct. 99 Despite the potential incorporation of prior judicial or legisla-
tive disparity, the Commission reasoned that such disparity was likely
to be considerably less than that resulting from prosecutorial deci-
sions.
Moreover, the Sentencing Commission was confronted with a
number of practical considerations. First, the Commission observed
great variety among the states in terms of the definitions of the sub-
stantive offenses; thus, employing a methodology similar to the of-
fense-based criminal history systems used by the states was considered
more difficult to implement in a national system. By basing the crimi-
nal history score on prior sentence length, the Commission hoped to
minimize the likely problems that would arise with cross-jurisdictional
differences. In other words, defendants in the federal system have
priors that result from federal prosecutions and from prosecutions in
the fifty state jurisdictions (not to mention the District of Columbia,
United States territories, and military adjudications).
Second, it was noted that the state and federal criminal history
systems define misdemeanors and felonies differently. In the federal
system, the distinction is fairly straightforward: offenses that authorize
sentences of imprisonment up to one year are misdemeanors, while
those one year and above are felonies:199 In contrast, some states cate-
gorize offenses that authorize sentences of imprisonment up to two
98 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36, § 4A1.2(a)
(defining the term "prior sentence").
" See Breyer, supra note 47, at 19 n.97.
ou See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (defining sentencing classification of offenses).
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years as misciemeanors.i'm Therefore, a system that utilized only mis-
demeanor and felony distinctions to assess criminal history score
would be inequitable and would present practical problems. A more
judicious measure of assessing criminal history, examining the under-
lying conduct of the prior offense, while theoretically more palatable,
raised serious practical, as well as legal, concerns. As a practical mat-
ter, the probation officer would need to obtain police reports (fre-
quently unavailable if offenses occurred more than five years ago)
which detail the real offense conduct and then spend substantial re-
sources comparing the offenses. With respect to legal concerns, con-
stitutional issues may arise with assessing criminal history points based
on the real offense behavior of the prior offense, particularly where
the plea was to a less serious offense." 2
Despite the legitimate concerns about an offense-based system,
the Sentencing Commission nevertheless chose to use at least some
elements of this type of system in constructing Chapter Four. As a re-
sult, the Career Offender and Armed Career Criminal guidelines
both utilize the nature of offense of conviction to determine the ap-
plicability of predicate offenses. 10m The current federal system is thus
something of a hybrid in that it uses both sentence length and offense
type to ascertain a criminal history score.
Ultimately, the Sentencing Commission decided to limit the use
of the offense-type in calculating criminal history scores because it
determined that assigning criminal history points based on the prior
sentence length provided a more realistic method because of its field
scoring reliability. If probation officers could not score actual cases
accurately and consistently, the Commission explained, both the pre-
dictive power and equity of the criminal history score would suffer.
The Commission considered that field scoring reliability of an of-
fense-based system would be affected by the complexity and difficulty
NI See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 903.1(2) (West 2000) (establishing a two year maximum
sentence for aggravated misdemeanors); MD. CODE ANN., Art. 2B ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES §
20-102 (2000) (establishing two year maximum for certain alcohol establishment Viola-
tions); Mien. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(16177) (2) (b) (Michie 2000) (establishing a two year
maximum; NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:43-1, 2C:43-6 (West 2000) (designating and defining a
"high misdemeanor" as a crime carrying a statutory penalty between one and five years)
sentence for certain licensing violations).
102 This is particularly true in the wake of the recent United States Supreme Court de-
cision, Apprendi v. Nero jersey. See 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2360-63 (2000) (finding that any fact,
except criminal history, that increases punishment beyond the statutory maximum must
be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
I" See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36,§ 481.1, § 4111.2 & ant.
n.1, § 4B1.4 & cmt. n.l.
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in obtaining verified information. This practical consideration was
critical in the adoption of the final version criminal history categories
and is likely the principal reason why the Commission's method of
assessing criminal history points varies so greatly from state guideline
systems. 1 °4
(b) The "Dangerousness" of Prior Offenses
Prior Sentencing Commission work has attempted to establish a
practical framework for analyzing the comparative "dangerousness" of
prior offenses. 105 Understanding the nature of the prior offenses
committed by Category I offenders is essential for understanding
whether criminal history category groupings achieve the purposes
outlined by the original Commission. Essentially, three elements have
been identified as serving as a proxy to measure an offense's
dangerousness: an injury resulting from the offense; the role of vio-
lence in the offense; or, the presence of a weapon during the
offense's cornmission.406 Inclusion of violence and injury in the
criteria is well-defined. Similarly, the presence of a weapon is generally
regarded as enhancing the likelihood of injury and violence, and,
hence, the offense's seriousness.
As might be expected, assault, robbery, and weapons trafficking
offenses each have high dangerousness components, roughly: 90%,
92%, and 93%, respectively. The types of danger involved in these
three offense types, however, reflect different patterns. Assault convic-
tions involve injury 43:4% of the time. Data from the ISS indicate that
the level of these injuries is high: 46.2% of assault convictions involve
serious injuries or death; an additional 27.9% involve minor injuries.
Violence without injury, however, occurs in 45.8% of assault convic-
tions.
104 See Hoffman & Beck, supra note 44, at 194. Ironically, this system also may have con-
tributed to the complexity that now exists in determining criminal history scores.
100 Linda Maxfield & Susannah Tarpley, Prior Dangerous Criminal Behavior and Sen-
tencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (May 2000) (Office of Policy Analysis,
U.S. Sentencing Commission) (on file with author).
100 Because, more often than not, these elements appear together in a case, the
definition ranks these three elements: injury supersedes violence and violence supersedes
weapon involvement. The method permits offenses to be hierarchically classified into a
dangerousness scale. If, for example, an offense involves both victim injury and weapon
use, this offense would appear in the "injury" category for dangerousness.
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Table 9
Distribution of Dangerousness Within Included Prior Offense Types Represented in
Criminal I-listories of Federal Offenders Sentenced in 1995 107
Offense Type of Prior Conviction Dangerousness Weapon Violence Injury
Assault 90.2%1 1% 45.8% 43,4%
Robbery 92% 10% 67% 15%
Weapons Trafficking 92.6% 76.2% 14.8% 1.6%
Although robbery convictions are less likely to involve injury
(15.0%), they often involve violence without injury (67.0%). For rob-
bery cases with injury, 7.1% involve serious injury and an additional
11.5% involve minor injury. Weapons trafficking offenses, on the
other hand, have the bulk (76.2%) of their dangerousness compo-
nent due to presence of a weapon, which by definition is an expected
element of the offense behavior. Although violence occurs 14.8% of
the time for these offenses, actual injury is uncommon (1.6%).
For all prior offenses (excluded and included) among Criminal
History Category I offenders with only a single point, 13.9% of those
offenses included some indicia of violence. Specifically, 3.6% of those
cases resulted in injury; 6.2% involved violence; and in 4.1% of those
cases, a weapon was present. Among those same offenders, 2.9% of
the excluded cases involved injury; 5.4% involved violence; and in 4.9%
of those cases, a weapon was present. In other words, nearly 3% of the
excluded cases involved an element of dangerousness.
Table 10
Distribution of Dangerousness Among Prior Offenses: One Point Criminal History I
Offenders Sentenced in 1995 1 °5
Weapon % Violence % Injury %
All Prior Offenses (n = 387) ' 4.1 6.2 3.6
Included Prior Offenses 	 = 183) 3.3 7.1 4.4
Excluded Prior Offenses (n = 204) 4.9 5.4 2.9
1 °7 The Five Percent Intensive Study Sample includes 1,018 offenders in Criminal His-
tory Category I with a combined total of 836 prior convictions. This table excludes cases
where offender data are missing for any or all of the following variables: prior offense type
and the number of criminal history points assigned to a prior conviction. FIVE PERCENT
SAMPLE, supra note 90.
10 The chart includes only offenders in Criminal History Category I with one criminal
history point. "All prior offenses" includes all prior convictions, whether or not receiving
criminal history points. FIVE PERCENT SAMPLE, supra note 90.
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For defendants who had no criminal history points (and thus no
included prior offenses), their excluded offenses nevertheless had
elements of dangerousness. For those offenders, 1.7% of their ex-
cluded convictions resulted in injury; 5.5% involved violence; and in
3.3% of the excluded cases, a weapon was present. Thus, in fully
10.5% of the cases excluded from consideration under the criminal
history score, some sort of dangerousness was present. Despite that
seemingly significant number of prior offenses involving some aspect
of violence, these offenders nevertheless have a "clear" score for
criminal history purposes.
Table I 1
Distribution of Dangerousness Among Prior Offenses: "Zero Point" Criminal History I
Offenders Sentenced in 1995 109
Weapon
%
Violence
%
Injury
All Prior Offenses
(n = 417)
3.3 '	 5.5 1.7
Included Prior N/A N/A N/A
Offenses (n = 0)
Excluded Prior 3.3 5.5 1.7
Offenses (n = 417)
As an indication of how potentially dangerous these excluded
cases are, the ISS data indicate that guns are the most likely weapons
involved in prior offense behavior. While the presence of any weapon
increases the opportunity for injury or violence, firearms make the
offense especially serious. Depending upon offense type, the propor-
tion of weapons that are guns ranges from sixty percent and higher.
The only exception to that is with respect to assault convictions, where
fewer than fifty percent of weapons involved are guns. The presence
of dangerousness in these cases suggests that the exclusion criteria
perhaps ought to be re-examined.
ii. Prior Similar Offenses in Criminal History Category I
A central concept undergirding the criminal history categories is
the control of recidivist behavior among offenders. Recidivist theory
under the guidelines has two separate, interrelated grounds. The first
is whether there are offenses that, when committed, are reliable pre-
109 The table includes only offenders in Criminal History Category 1 with zero criminal
history points. "Ail prior offenses" includes all prior convictions, whether or not receiving
criminal history points. FIVE PERCENT SAMPLE, supra note 90.
20011	 Sentencing Guidelines	 329
dictors of future criminality. Such questions are complicated, and in-
volve fairly complicated statistical methodologies that have been sub-
jected to considerable criticistn. 110 Indeed, while the inclusion of
seemingly minor crimes—such as non-felony vehicular offenses—in
the calculation of criminal histories has been severely criticized, it is
important to note that such offenses may, in fact, be good predictors
of future criminality.'" That is not to say they are in fact such reliable
predictors, it is merely important to know—before including or ex-
cluding a particular offense—whether it serves that function. The
difficulty is that without further empirical study, it is difficult to de-
termine which offenses ought to be included on those grounds.
A second use of prior criminality, however, is to determine
whether a defendant's behavior ought to be assessed criminal history
points because she has committed the same sort of offense before and
thus is more culpable for the present offense because she had "no-
tice" that her behavior was illegal. The notion being that if a defen-
dant is once convicted, and punished, for committing a particular of-
fense, a second conviction for the same type of criminal conduct
should result in a more substantial penalty. Congress has explained
this as follows:
The guidelines should provide that those with previous
criminal histories should be punished more severely than
first offenders, because the level of culpability of a person
with a prior record is higher, and such a person is on fair no-
11 ° See Stephen D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Accuracy of Prediction Models, in 2
CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS," 239-40 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986);
see also A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 18-2.2, commentary at 68 (1979); John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the
Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. Lj. 975, 1001-07, 1018-27 (1978); Peter B.
Hoffman, Screening for Risk: A Revised Salient Factor Score (SFS 81), 11 J. CRIM. JUSTICE, 539,
542-43 (1983).
"I It has been noted that:
Mite of the best predictors of future criminal conduct is past criminal con-
duct, and the parole-prediction literature amply supports this fact, From the
earliest studies to the latest, indices of prior criminal conduct consistently are
found to be among the most powerful predictors .... This generalization
tends to hold regardless of the measure of prior criminal conduct used or of
specific operational definitions of that conduct.
Gottfredson Sc Goufredson, supra note 110, at 239-40.
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tice that subsequent convictions subject such a person to en-
hancement of punishment. 112
In reviewing this facet of recidivism, the following table outlines
the instant offense distribution for Criminal History Category I of-
fenders in the 1995 ISS data:
Table 12
Instant Offense Distribution for the CHG I Offenders
Type of Offense	 # of Offenders	 % of Offenders
Missing -9	 3	 0.3
Assault	 18	 1.8
Robbery	 23	 2.3
Theft	 80	 7.9
Drug	 439	 43.1
White Collar	 255	 25
Weapons	 99
	 9.7
Other Serious
	 79	 7.8
Minor
	 22	 2.2
As might be expected, drug offenses (43.1% of offenders) and white
collar crime offenses (25.0% of offenders) dominate the field.
Among all prior convictions of offenders who also had a single
criminal history point, 8.4% had a prior minor conviction, 4.2% had a
prior theftn 3
 conviction, and 2.0% had a prior assault conviction. Ex-
amining convictions excluded from the criminal history computation,
9.9% had one prior minor convictioni" (8.9% had more than one
such conviction) and 6.4% had a prior theft conviction (1.7% had
more than one theft conviction). Similarly, 0.8% had one or more
robbery convictions (which has a high incidence of violence) and
2.8% had one or more assaults.
"2 FIR. REP. No. 99-523-44, at 99 (1984) (report accompanying U.R. 6012, one of
the sentencing guideline bills considered prior to passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984).
115 The theft category used in this and the following tables includes offenses such as
commercial or dwelling burglary, larceny, grand and auto theft, or retail theft.
114
 The other minor offenses category includes offenses such as disorderly conduct,
vehicular offenses, DUI/DWI offenses, simple drug possession, gambling, public intoxica-
tion, loitering, and prostitution.
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Table 13
Patterns of Repeat Prior Convictions: Excluded Convictions CHC 1 Federal Offenders
Sentenced in 1995 115
No Prior Convictions
for this Offense Type
One Prior Conviction Two or More Priors for
for this Offense Type	 this Offense Type
Assault 97.2 1.8 1
Robbery 99.2 0.7 0.1
Theft 91.9 6.4 1.7
Drug Trafficking 98.4 L5 0.1
White Collar 97.9 1.8 0.3
Weapon Trafficking 98.5 1.2 0.3
Other Serious 98.1 1.6 0.3
Other Minor 81.2 9.9 8.9
To break these numbers down even further, of the 1018 sampled
offenders, 439 committed drug offenses, and of those defendants, 18
had a prior drug offense of some sort. Of those 99 weapons offenders,
6 defendants had prior weapons offenses; 116 and of the 18 defendants
who committed assaults, 5 had previously committed a similar offense.
While not prevalent in Criminal History Category I , there are
offenders who have prior offenses that are similar to their present of-
fense of conviction that have nevertheless been excluded from the
criminal history calculation. If defendants who repeat certain criminal
actions are deemed more culpable than those who have not previ-
ously offended, then consideration ought to be given to including
otherwise excludable convictions that are similar to the present of-
fense of conviction.
III. SAFETY VALVE ADJUSTMENTS FOR LOW-LEVEL OFFENDERS
A discussion of first-time offenders cannot be complete without
reference to the so-called sentencing safety valve. Contrary to popular
belief, there are actually two safety.valves—one statutory and one con-
tained within the guidelines. This innovation—generated in part by
" 5 The Five Percent Intensive Study Sample includes 1,018 offenders in Criminal His-
tory Category I. Percentages indicate the proportion of offenders with a given number of
prior excluded convictions for the listed offense categories. For example, 97.2% of Crimi-
nal History Category 1 offenders had no prior assault convictions, while 1.8% had only one
prior excluded assault conviction, and 1.0% had two or more prior excluded assault con-
victions. Chart includes only those prior convictions that did not receive criminal history
points. FIVE PERCENT SAMPLE, supra note 90.
" 6 The weapons trafficking category includes offenses such as unlawffil trafficking,
sale or distribution of weapons, unlawful possession or carrying of a weapon, or unlawfully
carrying a concealed weapon,
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Congress and in part by the Sentencing Commission—grew in some
measure from a belief that first-time, low-level drug offenders merited
a reduction in the relatively lengthy federal sentences for drug
crhnes.117
 In particular, the idea was that these low-level offenders
should be able to escape out from under the congressionally imposed
mandatory minimum sentences.
A. The Legislative Safety Valve
As a result—in part—of a congressional inquiry, in 1993-94, the
Department of Justice undertook an analysis of allegedly non-violent
drug offenders with minimal criminal histories. 118 At that time, there
were slightly over 90,000 inmates incarcerated in federal prison. 119
Separating out drug offenders, the Department of Justice concluded
that there were 16,316 federal inmates (36.1% of all drug offenders
and 21.2% of the total sentenced federal prison population) who
could be classified as "low-lever drug law violators. The Department
defined a low-level offender as one who had "no current or prior vio-
lence in their records, no involvement in sophisticated criminal activ-
ity, and no prior [prison] commitment." 120 Adjusting the data to
reflect only those offenders who had zero criminal history points, the
Department still found 12,727 inmates who met this classification.
Among these violators, even though 42.3% played only "peripheral
roles" in drug trafficking, two-thirds of the low-level offenders never-
theless came under then-existing mandatory minimum statutes. 121
The study seemed to support the general belief that a substantial
number of low-level drug offenders were incarcerated in federal pris-
ons. Although the Department of Justice made no specific recom-
117
 That is, federal sentences are "relatively lengthy" in comparison with state sentences
imposed for similar narcotics offenses. See, e.g., Michael A. Simmons, Prosecutorial Discretion
and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893,
916-17 (2000); Alistair Neubern, Comment, Good Cop, Bad cop, Federal Prosecution of State
Legalized Medical Marijuana Use After United States v. Lopez, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1575, 1584
(2000). For a discussion of the safety valve and its interaction with mandatory minimum
sentences and the guidelines generally, see Phillip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing:
Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CINN. L. REV. 1851 (1995), and
Virginia G. Villa, Retooling Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Fixing the Federal "Statutory Safety
Valve" to Act as an Effective Mechanism for Clemency in Appropriate Cases, 21 HAMLINE L. REV.
109 (1997).
118 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF NON-VIOLENT DRUG OFFENDERS WITH
MINIMAL CRIMINAL HrsToRiEs, executive summary p.1 (1994).
119 Id.
120 Id,
121 Id,
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mendation as to what, if any, policies should have been implemented
on the basis of its study, Congress took up the cudgel and enacted, as
part of the 1994 Crime Bill, a sentencing "safety valve." 122 That legisla-
tion enabled certain low-level drug offenders to escape out from un-
der mandatory minimum drug sentences, provided the offenders met
the following rigorous criteria. The defendant should: (1) have no
more than a single criminal history point; (2) not have used violence
or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or any other dan-
gerous weapon in connection with the offense; (3) have neither an
aggravated role in the offense, nor have otherwise acted as an organ-
izer or supervisor of others in committing the offense; and (4) have
provided, no later than the time of the sentencing hearing, all truth-
ful information in his possession concerning the offense itself, or any
offenses that were part of the same scheme of conduct. In addition,
the present offense of conviction could not have resulted in the death
or serious bodily injury of any person, and must have been a narcotics
violation for which a mandatory minimum sentence applied and
which could not be any lower than a base offense level of twenty-six.
Although it seems strange that the safety valve would be limited to
those with a base offense level of twenty-six or greater, Congress
seemed to intend that some sort of a minimum period of incarcera-
tion was necessary. 123 Had the safety valve been extended to those be-
low a base offense level of twenty-six more defendants would have re-
ceived probation. 124 The safety valve is a useful tool for looking at low-
level offenders because it is limited to those who fall within Criminal
History Category 1 and therefore do not have significant (recorded)
criminal pasts.
An important feature of the safety valve is that it permits defen-
dants to obtain relief from the statutory minimum even if they have
no relevant information to provide to the government. The defen-
dant must provide all relevant information concerning his present
criminal conduct, but if he is a relatively insignificant figure with re-
spect to the underlying criminal scheme, he can still benefit from the
in See Pub. L. No. 103-460, H.R. 3979 (codified at. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (f)(1)—(5)
(1994)).
123 In fact, in P.L. 103-322, section 8000], of the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act,
Congress, in adopting the legislative safety valve, expressly directed the Sentencing Com-
mission that: In the case of a defendant for whom the statutorily required minimum sen-
tence is five years, such guidelines and amendments to the guidelines ... shall call for a
guideline range in which the lowest term of imprisonment is at least twenty-four months."
108 Stat. 1986.
124 see id,
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safety valve. Prior to Congress' adoption of the safety valve, many low-
level offenders did not have the information necessary to receive a
section 5K1.1 departure. This meant that perhaps the defendants best
suited to receiving a mitigated sentence were denied that opportunity
merely because of their negligible role in the offense. In addition to
correcting that sentencing anomaly, even if the court determines that
the defendant has qualified for the safety valve, it nonetheless remains
free to depart downwards on other grounds as well (i.e., family ties
and responsibility).
B. The Sentencing Guidelines Safety Valve
In addition to the statutory safety valve, the Sentencing Commis-
sion itself created an analogue in the guidelines. There is a hidden
problem with using the one point definition, rather than the Criminal
History Category I definition for triggering the safety valve. By assign-
ing criminal history points on the basis of sentence length and with-
out necessarily taking into account the nature of the prior criminal
conduct, the original Commission acknowledged that it might be
overly inclusive in how it scored a prior criminal history. In other
words, a defendant's record might not be indicative either of her
dangerousness, or her likelihood of recidivism. As a consequence, the
Commission provided a "safety valve" of its own in the form of an ap-
proved method of departure from criminal history scores:
There may be cases where the court concludes that a defen-
dant's criminal history category significantly over-represents
the seriousness of a defendant's criminal history or the like-
lihood that the defendant will commit further crimes. An
example might include the case of a defendant with two mi-
nor misdemeanor convictions close to ten years prior to the
instant offense and no other evidence of prior criminal be-
havior in the intervening period. The court may conclude
that the defendant's criminal history was significantly less se-
rious than that of most defendants in the same criminal his-
tory category . . . and therefore consider a downward depar-
ture from the guidelines. 125
The Sentencing Commission thus sanctioned a downward depar-
ture in the situation in which the assigned criminal history category
125
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36,§4A1.3.
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overstated the defendant's culpability. As noted, in 11.5% of the
downward departure cases in 1999, the judges identified the "ade-
quacy of criminal history" as the reason for the departure, suggesting
that the assigned criminal history category overstated the defendant's
actual criminal record. 126
C. The Legislative Safety Valve in Operation
The safety valve has had a fairly substantial impact upon the sen-
tences of low-level narcotics offenders. As the following table demon-
strates, the median sentence length for those with zero criminal his-
tory points fell from sixty months in 1993 (the final full year before
the safety valve's application) to only thirty-six months as of 1999.
Similarly, those offenders with but a single criminal history point saw
their median sentences fall from sixty months in 1993, to forty-six
months in 1999.
Table 14
Average Length of Imprisonment for Drug Trafficking Cases With Zero or One
Criminal History Point over Time 127
Fiscal Year
N
Zero Points
Mean Median N
One Point
Mean Median
1999 9,121 49.5 36 2,124 62.5 46
1998 8,384 53.7 37 1,948 63.8 46
1997 7,768 56.7 37 1,812 66.4 48
1996 6,694 63.2 46 1,741 69.3 49
1995 5,975 66.9 48 1,510 74.0 57
1994 6,737 71.0 51 1,660 75.4 60
1993 7,815 73.3 60 1,843 73.9 60
1992 7,159 76.8 60 1,737 80.9 60
1991 6,272 77.5 60 1,472 73.7 60
Those are fairly substantial drops, which can be at least partially
attributed to the safety valve legislation. To some extent, it is possible
this decrease may also reflect a growing number of drug trafficking
prosecutions where the offenders engaged in less serious conduct.
Congress' decision to increase law enforcement resources over the last
decade has enabled federal agents to focus not only on so-called drug
kingpins, but also on less culpable supporting staff within the
126 See id.
127 Only cases sentenced under Drug Trafficking (§ 201.1) were included in this table.
Cases with zero months prison as well as cases missing information about criminal history
points or length of imprisonment were excluded. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1991-
1999 DATAFILE, USSCFY91—USSCFY99 (on file with author).
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trafficking organizations as wel1. 128
 The guidelines, of course, even
without the benefit of the safety valve, are designed so that lower-level
defendants receive substantially shorter sentences than upper-level
defendants. As a consequence, if lower-level offenders are being more
frequently apprehended and punished, then to the extent that this
less culpable group of offenders' grows in number more rapidly than
the kingpins, overall average sentences will show a decline. Absent
evidence to the contrary, however,,in light of the fairly precipitous fall
in sentence lengths after the safety valve's adoption, it is not unrea-
sonable to presume that it has had at least some effect in lowering the
sentences for qualifying defendants.
In 1999, of the 55,557 federal offenders sentenced under the
guidelines, some 21,635 fell under section 2D1.1—the drug
trafficking guideline—and thus became eligible to be considered for
the safety valve. Pursuant to Sentencing Commission data, 8,096 de-
fendants, representing 37.4% of all drug trafficking offenders, did not
receive a mandatory minimum sentence.
Table 15
Drug Trafficking Offenders and Mandatory Minimum Statusi"
Drug Mandatory Minimum Status
TOTAL
N
21,634 100.0
No Drug Mandatory 8,096 37.4
5 Year Drug Mandatory 6,308 29.2
10 Year Drug Mandatory 6,844 31.6
More than 10 Year Drug Mandatory 386 1.8
In all, 13,538 defendants fell within the ambit of mandatory minimum
sentencing of either five, ten, or more than ten year mandatory
minimums. For those individuals sentenced under the drug
trafficking guidelines,'" 15,195 (75.0%) did not receive the benefit of
the safety valve, while 5053 (25.0%) did.
128 As an example of budget and staff growth, between 1994 and 1998, the Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) budget increased 45.4%, the DEA criminal investigation
staff increased 22.7% during that same time period, and the total national drug investiga-
tion budget increased 19.8%. TRAC Analysis. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
Analysis, available at http://wmv.tracsynedultracciea/findings/nationalideabudget.html.
129
 Of the 55,557 cases, 21,635 were sentenced under Drug Trafficking (§ 2D1.1). Of
these, one case was missing drug mandatory minimum information. U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 1999 Datafile, USSCFY99.
00
 Some 1387 offenders fell out of this table and were not counted.
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'fable 16
Safety Valve and Drug Mandatory Minimum Status for Drug Trafficking Offendersist
Drug Mandatory Minimum Status
Received
Safety Valve
No
Safety Valve
TOTAL 5,053 100.0 15,195 100.0
No Drug Mandatory 638 12.6 7,009 46.1
5 Year Drug Mandatory 2,398 47.5 3,514 23.1
10 Year Drug Mandatory 2,007 39.7 4,316 28.4
More than 10 Year Drug Mandatory 10 0.2 356 2.3
Interestingly, the safety valve, while operating fairly closely to
Congress' expressed intent, has created a few wrinkles in its applica-
tion. In 1999, for example, 638 defendants received the benefit of the
safety valve although they did not face a mandatory minimum sen-
tence. This is curious in that the safety valve, of course, was expressly
designed to trump mandatory minimums. Not unsurprisingly, as the
mandatory minimums increased from ten years to more than ten
years, the number of defendants receiving the safety valve dropped
precipitously. In contrast, both the absolute number, and the percent,
of offenders receiving the safety valve increased as between those fac-
ing five year mandatory minimums and those facing ten year manda-
tory minimums. Of the defendants who had zero criminal history
points, 4,072 received the safety valve, and 5,068 did not. Some 930
defendants with one point received the safety valve, while 1,229 did
not. And, among defendants with more than a single criminal history
point, 45 received the safety valve, while 8,870 did not.
Table 17
Safety Valve Adjustment and Criminal History Points for Drug Trafficking Offenders 132
Number of Criminal History Points	 Received Safety Valve 	 No Safety Valve
N
TOTAL 5,047 100.0 15,167 100.0
Zero Points 4,072 80.7 5,068 33.4
One Point 930 18.4 1,229 8.1
More than One Point 45 0.9 8,870 58.5
131 Of the 55,557 cases, 21,635 were sentenced under Drug Trafficking (§ 2D1.1). Of
these, 1387 cases were excluded for one or both of the following reasons: missing informa-
tion on safety valve status (1387) or missing drug mandatory minimum information (1).
1999 DATAFILE, supra note 77.
132 Of the 55,557 cases, 21,635 were sentenced under Drug Trafficking (3 2D1.1). Of
these, 1421 cases were excluded due to missing information on safety valve status or miss-
ing information on criminal history points. 1999 DATAF1LE, supra note 77.
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Table 17
Safety Valve Adjustment and Criminal History Points for Drug Trafficking Offenderstm
Number of Criminal History Points
	 Received Safety Valve
	 No Safety Valve
N	 %	 N
TOTAL
	 5,047	 100.0
	 15,167	 100.0
Of those offenders who did not receive the safety valve, the single
most common reason for their not receiving it was due to failing sev-
eral of the requisite criteria. Indeed, 5,556 defendants, 38.9% of all
those sentenced for engaging in drug trafficking, failed two or more
of the individual criteria required to qualify for the safety valve. 133 The
second most common reason for defendants not to receive the safety
valve is that they fall outside Criminal History Category I—fully 29.1%
of these defendants, 4,152 individuals, have more than one criminal
history point. Following closely behind, 23.4% of defendants, 3,349
individuals, are unable to qualify because their base offense levels are
below twenty-six. The remaining defendants failed to qualify because:
a weapon was present during the commission of the offense (575 de-
fendants or 4.0%); they played a supervisory role in the offense or
had some sort of aggravating factor present that denied them the
safety valve (312 defendants or 2.2%); they did not provide adequate
information to the government with respect to the offense of convic-
tion (317 defendants or 2.2%); 134
 of obstruction (24 defendants or
0.2%); or finally, bodily injury or death to an individual resulted dur-
ing the course of the offense's commission (1 defendant).
Table 18
Reasons Drug Trafficking Offenders Did Not Receive the Safety Valve Adjustment 135
Reasons N %
TOTAL 14,286 100.0
Criminal History Greater Than Category I 4,152 29.1
Weapon Involved in Offense 575 4.0
155
 Given currently available data, it is impossible to discern the precise reason the de-
fendant does not receive the safety valve. It is not unlikely that the sentencing judge, rather
than focusing upon a single failing, instead simply declines to apply the safety valve when it
is clear multiple criteria will not be met.
134
 Because this number is difficult to ascertain, I have elected to use acceptance of' re-
sponsibility as a proxy for this category. While an imperfect measure, it most closely ap-
proximates this criterion.
"5
 Of the 55,557 cases, 21,635 were sentenced under Drug Trafficking (§ 21)1.1). Of
these, 15,195 offenders did not receive the safety valve adjustment. Of these, 909 cases
were excluded because the reason why they did not receive the safety valve could not be
determined. 1999 DATAFILE, supra note 77.
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Table 18
Reasons Drug Trafficking Offenders Did Not Receive the Safety Valve Adjustment136
Reasons
TOTAL 14,286 100.0
Received Aggravating Role Adjustment 312 2.2
Did Not Receive Acceptance of Responsibility 317 2.2
Base Offense Level Less Than 26 3,349 23.4
Received Obstruction ofjustice Adjustment 24 0.2
Bodily Injury was Involved in Offense 1 0.0
Multiple Reasons 5,556 38.9
Finally, of those defendants otherwise eligible for the safety
valve—those meeting each of the required criteria on paper-4,720
received the safety valve at sentencing, while 909 did not. As can be
expected, 14,286 of those defendants not qualifying for the safety
valve did not receive it. What is odd, however, is that 333 defendants
who did not appear to qualify for the safety valve, nevertheless re-
ceived it. This apparent anomaly warrants further investigation.
Table 19
Safety Valve and Eligibility Status for Drug Trafficking Offenders"6
Eligibility Status Received Safety Valve No Safety Valve
N % N %
TOTAL 5,053 100.0 15,195 100.0
Eligible 4,720 93.4 909 6.0
Ineligible 333 6.6 14,286 94.0
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Criminal History and its Discontents: The Judiciary's View
Criticisms of the present construction of criminal history are nei-
ther new, nor confined to the academic community. In a 1996 survey
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), federal district
court judges had the opportunity to weigh in on, among other things,
"6 Of the 55,557 cases, 21,635 were sentenced under Drug Trafficking (§ 201.1). Of
these, 1387 cases were excluded due to missing information on safety valve stains (1387).
Eligibility status required that the offender have all of the following requirements: be in
Criminal History Category I, not have a weapon SOC or 18 U.S.C. § 924 conviction, not
have an aggravating role adjustment, receive the acceptance of responsibility adjustment,
have a base offense level of at least 26, not receive the obstruction of justice adjustment,
and not receive any adjustments for bodily injury. 1999 DATAME, Mira note 77.
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the construction of the criminal history categories. 137 While the survey
instrument itself did not permit judges to comment expressly on the
structure of Criminal History Category I, it did allow judges to com-
ment on some important foundational elements. 138 For example, the
judges strongly indicated that the assignment of criminal history
points should rely more on the prior offense's nature rather than
solely upon its sentence length (89.9% agreement) and that the exis-
tence of prior violence should be accorded more weight in criminal
history scoring (94.3% agreement). 139
 Indeed, the judges appeared to
have concerns that the guidelines failed adequately to address violent
acts in a defendant's past. Only 37.0% of district judges agreed that
the criminal history score satisfactorily distinguishes between violent
and nonviolent offenders. 140
 A majority (64.4%) of these same judges
observed that the criminal history scores for offenders with violent
prior offenses are appropriate. 141 Although the judges generally con-
curred that the criminal history scores were appropriate for non-
violent offenses (68.2% agreement), they felt that prior misdemeanor
and other minor offenses have a disproportionate effect on determin-
ing the proper criminal history category (61.6% agreement). 142
In addition, it can be inferred that district court judges have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with criminal history scores by exercising their
discretion to depart from the guideline range. In fiscal year 1999, dis-
trict judges cited "adequacy of criminal history" as a reason for depar-
ture in 40.7% of upward departure cases—suggesting that the guide-
lines did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's
criminal record. 143 Pertinent to this article, the judges similarly
identified the "adequacy of criminal history" as the reason in H.5% of
the downward departure cases—thus indicating that in those cases
the defendant's criminal past was given too much weight. 1"
Judges are not the only players in the criminal justice system that
have taken issue with the current structure of criminal history catego-
ries. Probation officers, those individuals who are tasked with assem-
bling the pre-sentence report and taking the first swipe at calculating
137
 MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY 23, 95-97 (1997).
138 Id. at 40.
139 Id. at 95.
14° Id. at 96.
I4I Id.
142 JOHNSON & GILBERT, supra note 137, at 96-97.
145
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36, § 4A1.3.
149 Id.
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the guidelines score, have observed that the current criminal history
methodology is of "questionable value in measuring dangerousness
and risk of recidivism:145 In the 1996 FJC survey, probation officers
agreed (82.0%) that prior violence should be given more weight in
criminal history. 146 And, compared to district court judges, probation
officers were even less likely to agree (29.2%) that the criminal history
score adequately distinguishes between violent and non-violent of-
fenders. 147
While the attitude of these important players in the criminal jus-
tice system reflects only their day-to-day working impressions of the
criminal history categories' effectiveness, they do suggest that, in the
field, there is some concern as to whether the categories are working
as intended.
13. Policy Directions
One of the more significant difficulties posed by the present
configuration of the criminal history categories is that they are (and
were) not based on any empirical study relating either to the predic-
tive power of certain scored prior crimes or a survey of the public's
feelings concerning °just deserts." As a result, the categories simply
represent a compromise among the original Sentencing Commission-
ers as to how certain interests might best be balanced. Nevertheless,
the Commission did initially indicate a desire to conduct research on
the criminal history categories' predictive power:
The Commission has developed a data base that will allow
testing of the predictive power of the criminal history score
in the near future. The Commission intends to conduct re-
search that will examine predictive power using various
measures of recidivism, and the extent of the crime-control
benefits derived from increasing sentences in relation to the
criminal history score. In addition, it will consider research
relating to other possible predictors of recidivism. Such re-
search will enable the Commission to assess the efficacy and
desirability of modification of the criminal history score
145 Caryl A. Ricca, Simplification of Chapter Four: Comments From the Probation Officers Advi-
sory Group to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 209, 212 (1997).
146 JOHNSON & GILBERT, supra note 137, at 95.
L47 AL at 96.
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and/or modification of the degree to which it affects the
guideline sentences.'"
Unfortunately, this research has yet to be done.' 49
 Until such research
is completed, it will be difficult to make significant changes to the
calibration of criminal history scores. 15° That research is vital to carry
out Congress' directive to the Sentencing Commission to structure
the guidelines so as to "reflect, . . . advancement in knowledge of hu-
man behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process."'" Regard-
less, even without this foundational research, we can perhaps make
distinctions on the basis of what we do know and recommend areas
that ought to be explored to better achieve the sentencing guidelines'
purposes as outlined by Congress.
1. Consideration for "True" First-Time Offenders
A basic problem with Criminal History Category I is that it treats
a wide range of defendants similarly despite the fact that they have
disparate levels of previous contact with the criminal justice system.
Defendants who have no previous contact of any kind—no prior ar-
rests, no pending charges, no dismissed charges, no prior convic-
tions—with any criminal justice system are lumped into the same
149 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 362.
149 As an illustration of this lack of an empirical basis, it is interesting to compare the
SFS and the criminal history categories. Consider two co-defendants convicted of securities
fraud. Defendant A served two prior concurrent prison sentences resulting from two resi-
dential burglary convictions that were deemed related. Defendant B served one prior
prison sentence of the same length resulting from conviction on one count of residential
burglary. Under the SFS and the original GUS, both defendants would have the same
score. The Sentencing Commission, however, revised the guidelines because it was con-
cerned that offenders were not receiving added punishment when prior "related" violent
offenses were grouped together. The Commission did not base its decision on the basis of
any empirical evidence that these defendants posed a significantly different risk of recidi-
vism. The Parole Commission, by contrast, has approached this same type of problem by
first determining whether there was empirical evidence of added predictive power.
150 The Department of Justice recently undertook a recidivism study to examine the
impact of expanding the safety valve to offenders who have up to three criminal history
points and to offenders who fall below offense level twenty-six. The study concluded that
extending the safety valve's benefits to offenders meeting either of these two criteria would
not pose a substantial risk to public safety and would result in significant cost savings for
the Bureau of Prisons (in terms of prison expenditures). Despite the study's potentially
flawed methodology and use of biased sample populations, it is at least a start to answering
some of the questions posed by the predictive power of the criminal history categories.
U.S. DEPT. OF JusTIcE, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, EXAMINATION OF RECIDI-
VISM RATES AND EXPANSION OF THE "SAFETY VALVE" (2000).
151 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (I) (C) (1994).
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criminal history category as those defendants who have at least one
prior conviction or defendants who have convictions excluded under
the guidelines for reasons such as the age of the conviction or the mi-
nor nature of the offense. If one accepts'the premise that these true
first-time offenders ought not to be treated similarly, at least in terms
of criminal history, then Category I would appear to be in need of a
facelift.
Congress would seem to agree with this assessment because in 28
U.S.C. § 994( j), it directed the Sentencing Commission to "insure
that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a
sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is
a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or
an otherwise serious offense." 152 By failing to incorporate a proper
first-time offender category in the guidelines, the Commission may
not have adequately addressed this statutory directive. 153
In a limited way, defendants have gamely tried to implement
Congress' instruction by encouraging courts to make downward de-
partures on the basis of first-time offender status. However, their ef-
forts ground to a halt in the wake of Koon v. United States. 154 In Koon,
the United States Supreme Court concluded that a departure below
the lower limit of the guideline range for Criminal History Category I
on the basis of the adequacy of criminal history is inappropriate. 155
The Court observed that Criminal History Category I is expressly de-
signed to accommodate first-time offenders who have (arguably) the
lowest risk of recidivism. 156 As a consequence, the Court reasoned, a
departure on the basis of first-time offender status can never be ap-
propriate because the Sentencing Commission had taken this status
into account in designing the criminal history categories. 157 Thus, the
152 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (1994).
155 In 1991, a criminal history working group investigated this issue (as well as the pos-
sible addition of a seventh criminal history category). The group recommended several
amendment options designed to address this issue, but the Sentencing Commission took
no action at that time. See United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 827 (5th Cir. 1989). The
Commission's compliance with this directive, however, has been challenged in a number of
cases and uniformly rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Lueddeke, 908 F.2d 230, 232-33
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
See518 U.S. 81, Ill (1996).
155 See id.
156 See
157 Id. at i 11. Indeed, before the Supreme Court's decision in ;Coon, the circuit courts,
of appeals had largely similarly rejected downward departures on the basis of the inade-
quacy of the criminal history categories. Because the Sentencing Commission expressly
weighed a defendant's prior criminal conduct and thus fashioned the criminal history
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likelihood of petitioners' recidivism was not itself appropriate to con-
sider as a separate basis for departure.
As a result, the creation of a first-time offender category would
need to be done either at Congress' behest, or by the Sentencing
Commission itself. The Commission could easily do this either by
adopting some sort of a guided downward departure that would per-
mit district court judges to depart provided certain criteria were met,
or by creating a new Criminal History Category I for defendants with
no known prior convictions. While such an approach would doubt-
lessly result in false positives—for example, some individuals may have
unrecorded juvenile or foreign convictions—that problem standing
alone should not be a distraction. After all, we traditionally grant de-
fendants the benefit of the doubt in numerous legal circumstances.
The fact that not every prior conviction is properly recorded should
not necessarily count against the defendant.
The difficulty with such an approach, however, would be that the
statutory mandatory minimum would continue to trump any down-
ward departure or adjustment the Sentencing Commission might
adopt. Congress could thus expand, or otherwise modify the safety
valve provision contained in the 1994 Crime Control Act. The De-'
partment of Justice recently undertook a limited recidivism study to
examine the impact of expanding the safety valve to offenders who
have up to three criminal history points and/or to offenders who fall
below offense level twenty-six. The study concluded that extending
the safety valve's benefits to offenders meeting either of these two cri-
teria would not pose a substantial risk to public safety and would re-
sult in significant cost savings for the Bureau of Prisons. Despite the
study's use of somewhat biased sample populations, it does suggest
that—at least with respect to recidivism—extending the safety valve's
reach will not adversely affect public safety. 158
 While Congress would
have to legislatively alter the safety valve's application to offenders in
other than Criminal History Category I, the Sentencing Commission
could choose to extend the safety valve's benefits to those falling be-
low the offense level twenty-six floor.
categories to provide leniency to defendants without prior criminal records, courts
deemed it inappropriate to grant departures on this basis. See, e.g., United States v. Talk,
158 F.3d 1064, 1072-73 (10th Cir. 1998); United Slates v. Wind, 128 F.3d 1276, 1278 (8th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Nolanco, 53 F.3d 893, 898 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ar-
doin, 19 F.3c1 177, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th
Cir. 1991).
" U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 150.
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2. Violent Offenses
A more sweeping change to criminal history categories that
would affect not merely first-time offenders, but also those at the top
of the criminal history scale, would be to change the criminal history
calculation to a prior offense of conviction typography system in
which each criminal history category would represent a different
"type" of prior record. Under such a system, the least serious category
would be reserved for defendants with no prior violent felonies. Each
additional category would be based upon an increasing number of
violent offenses. Category I would thus be reserved exclusively for
those offenders with no prior recorded convictions.
The consideration of a prior offense's relative severity—based
upon a "violence" index—would have the advantage of focusing re-
sources on dangerous offenders. Although there are variations in how
violence is included in the sentencing calculation, nearly every extant
sentencing guideline system considers the severity of a defendant's
prior crimes in the determination of the sentence for a present of-
fense. Minnesota, for example, assigns prior felony offenses from one-
half to two points depending upon the offense's "severity level."159
Pennsylvania's most serious category of prior convictions includes
murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, involuntary devi-
ant intercourse, arson, and robbery. 16° Convictions for these offenses
receive four points, the maximum amount assessable for a prior con-
viction. Similarly, in Oregon, criminal history is categorized by prior
offense type—specifically violent versus non-violent offenses. 161 Other
systems use prior record categories that rely less on numerical scores
and instead differentiate among types of offenders, such as those with
violent prior convictions or those with multiple felony convictions (a
common proxy for severity). 162
A variation on this approach might be for the Sentencing Com-
mission• to alter the current method of assessing criminal history
points from the length of sentence imposed to an offense-based sys-
tem. This system could be accomplished in a variety of ways, such as
categorizing offenses on the basis of misdemeanor versus felony, non-
violent versus violent, or by using an offense severity scale such as the
1" See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, II.13.1.a.
166 See 9 FED. SENT. R. 216, sec. IV (1997).
161 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 34, at 706.
162 See id.
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SFS. Indeed, the SFS has long been used by the Parole Commission as
a reliable means of predicting recidivism.
It has been demonstrated that dangerousness levels of prior con-
victions are inconsistent with the guidelines' current point assignment
system, which is based solely on prior sentence length. 163 Prior sen-
tence length, however, may not directly correlate with the nature of
the offense. 164
 Certain state sentencing systems 163 have developed
fairly sophisticated methods of determining prior offense seriousness
that do not rely exclusively upon previous sentence length. 166 The rich
information collected by parole officers in constructing the presen-
tencing reports could be an invaluable aid in determining the nature
of an offense.
Under either of these variations, the Sentencing Commission
could consider assigning additional points for pre-determined violent
offenses, but at the same time refuse to ignore convictions that are
older, were committed when the defendant was a juvenile, or other-
wise fall into any of the major exclusion categories (provided the pre-
vious offenses are violent in nature). Similarly, the Commission ought
to determine whether certain non-violent misdemeanors (or certain
felonies) ought to be eliminated from the criminal history calcula-
tion. Certain traffic offenses, such as driving while intoxicated, are
often cited as examples of offenses that may not merit criminal his-
tory points. While, at first blush, this makes a certain amount of intui-
tive sense, the Commission would need to determine whether those
offenses were in any way predictive of recidivist behavior.
3. Repeated Offenses
The Sentencing Commission could also choose to provide extra
points for each repeat offense the defendant commits. This would
remove certain offenders from Criminal History Category I. Thus, a
defendant who had already committed a fraud before might, on a
subsequent fraud conviction, be assigned additional points. Under
this scenario, the Commission would consider prior offenses regard-
less of whether they qualify for exclusion under the present criteria.
165 Maxfield & Tarpley, supra note 105. That study demonstrates that sentence length
alone is not always highly correlated with offense severity.
469 Id .
165 Notably Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. See Kirpatrick,
supra note 34, at 681.
166 Julian V. Roberts, Refining the Criminal History Guidelines: A Few Lessons from the Slates,
9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 213, 213-14 (1997).
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The central issue would always be whether the offenses are predictive
of future criminal conduct or whether they make the defendant more
culpable. Professor Von Hirsch ha's explained that: "The reason for
treating the first offense as less serious is . . . that repetition alters the
degree of culpability that may be ascribed to the offender.. . . A repe-
tition of the offense following that conviction may be regarded as
more culpable."167
One may disagree that a repeated offense—if otherwise not pre-
dictive of future criminality—makes an offender more culpable,
hence more deserving of punishment, but this is certainly a com-
monly held belief. 168 The Sentencing Commission expressly made this
"increased culpability" upon the basis of a prior, similar offense an
explicit consideration in creating the criminal history categories. Cer-
tainly, as an intuitive matter, it may make at least some difference that
an individual has previously engaged in criminal conduct that is simi-
lar to the present offense of conviction. Questions of notice and cul-
pability doubtless cut against the defendant at that point. As with each
of these circumstances, however, more research needs to be under-
taken.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether to treat first-time or low-level offenders
differently from those with more ambitious criminal histories is one
legal policymakers have been debating for some time. While the gen-
eral impulse is to treat such offenders differently, it is important to
differentiate between true first-time offenders and those who may
have prior convictions that, under current practice, may be excluded
from the criminal history score. Similarly, consideration should be
given to including present excludable prior convictions that contain
any elements of dangerousness or that may be predictive of future
criminality. In the same vein, thought might be given to including
otherwise excludable convictions if they are of the same general na-
ture as the defendant's present offense. Regardless, more empirical
research is needed to determine whether these convictions have any
predictive power. It may well prove that certain minor convictions,
which presently are scored, ought to be excluded, but that other ex-
cluded crimes ought to be included in the calculation. Congress has
157 VON HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 85.
168
 Doubtless Congress would agree with this understanding. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No.
99-523-44, at 99 (1984).
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directed the Sentencing Commission "to permit individualized sen-
tences when warranted," 169
 to "reflect . . advancement in knowledge
of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process"I" and
to "develop means of measuring the degree to which . . . sentencing
. . . practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing." 171
In light of years-long experience with criminal history categories and
the development of more sophisticated analytical devices, the Sen-
tencing Commission should undertake to fulfill Congress' will.
169
 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b) (1)(B) (1994).
1" 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (C) (1994).
171
 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2) (1994).
